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A. Introduction
International business is booming.' In fact, some say the pace of
globalization is faster and more comprehensive than at any time in
world history.2 While many of the top 500 largest corporations in the
1. See CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 5-6 (2d ed. 2006).
2. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Gives Seminar on History of Globalization, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2006, at C3. With such an unfettered explosion of international trade, Arthur Jensen's
portentous soliloquy, courtesy of the prophetic penmanship of Paddy Chayefsky, now seems
more realistic than bombastic: "We no longer live in a world of nations and ideologies .... The
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world remain headquartered in the United States, over fifty percent
are spread across over two dozen other countries.3 In addition, with
rapid technological advances, the twenty-first century international
business sector is no longer reserved for major, multi-national
corporations; small and medium-sized businesses are now global
players too.4 Because recent decades have seen a marked increase in
the size and complexity of international commercial transactions,5
the potential for transnational business disputes is perhaps greater
now than ever before.6
Fortunately, when such disputes arise, there exists an abundance
of fora for their resolution and/or settlement. One such forum is the
public court system where the business or its foreign trade partner is
located. However, litigating in national courts involves considerable
drawbacks, such as the potential for simultaneous litigation in
multiple jurisdictions or the uncertainty that a judgment will be
enforced outside of the jurisdiction where it is obtained.' Thus, with
the rise of the global economy, private dispute resolution processes,
world is a college of corporations, inexorably determined by the immutable bylaws of business."
NETWORK (Warner Bros. 1976).
3. See DANIELLE WALKER ET AL., DOING BUSINESS INTERNATIONALLY: THE GUIDE TO
CROSS-CULTURAL SUCCESS 11 (2d ed. 2003). Major international firms are headquartered
primarily in the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Germany, "but this concentration
is clearly changing as multi-nationals emerge mainly from the Asia-Pacific and Latin American
regions, particularly from countries like Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil." Id.
4. Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, "Civilized, " or
Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 39 (2003).
5. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. International business transactions have
become quite sophisticated and often involve multiple parties and government entities. Id.
Examples include "closely integrated distributorships, long-term 'take or pay' supply
arrangements, manufacturing joint ventures, high-technology licensing agreements, [and] natural
resource development projects," among others. Id.
6. See id.; Fabien G6linas, Arbitration and the Challenge of Globalization, J. INT'L ARB.,
Aug. 2000, at 117, 117.
7. See BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 27. See generally Emil Petrossian,
Developments, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Forum Shopping in the United States and
England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257, 1260-63 (2007) (providing a general overview of issues
and strategies parties ought to consider when selecting a forum to settle international disputes). If
and when the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294
[hereinafter Hague Convention], is ratified by contracting states and entered into force, the risks
of international litigation could diminish. The purpose of the recent Hague Convention was to
provide an analogue for litigation to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention], discussed infra. For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the Hague Convention,
see Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and
Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543 (2005).
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including international arbitration and other alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") mechanisms, have quickly become a vital
component of international business relationships.8 A recent study
on corporate attitudes towards such topics as international arbitration
and cross-border litigation reveals an overwhelming preference for
international arbitration over litigation in national courts.' And,
while arbitration may be the current preferred method for resolving
international business disputes, the past decade has seen an upsurge
in the use of non-arbitral ADR processes, most notably mediation
and conciliation.'
Commentators have recognized that the overall demand for
arbitration has increased significantly'2 and that American lawyers
have vigorously infiltrated the realm of international dispute
resolution.'3 Consequently, much has recently been written on the
advantages and disadvantages of international commercial arbitration
and related ADR methods. This article synthesizes these
commentaries in order to provide a sufficient overview of
international arbitration and other ADR processes for practitioners
who may be involved in an international business dispute.
Considering that arbitration is presently the favored method of
international dispute resolution, it commands much of the focus of
this article. The remainder is devoted to increasingly popular non-
arbitral ADR mechanisms. Accordingly, Part B discusses the
8. See Julie Barker, International Mediation-A Better Alternative for the Resolution of
Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International Commercial
Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1996).
9. See New Study Reports Multinational Corporations Prefer International Arbitration to
Litigation, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2006, at 12, 12 [hereinafter New Study]. This study,
sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers, was based on research by the School of International
Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London. In-house attorneys from 143 international
companies with revenues greater than $500 million were the study's subjects. Id.
10. Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
499, 499 (2006).
11. See Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, International ADR in the 1990's:
The Top Ten Developments, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 184, 219-21 (2001).
12. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 38-39.
13. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 80-82 (2003) ("Just as the United States has been and will be the
dominant force in economic globalization, our law firms will be the dominant force in
international arbitration."). See generally Michael Goldhaber, The Court that Came in from the
Cold, AM. LAW., May 2001, at 98 (examining the world of international arbitration and the
creeping Americanization against the backdrop of the dispute between Deutsche Telekom and
France Telecom).
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general history and current framework of international commercial
arbitration, including a discussion of the various private institutions
that offer this service. Part C delves into common procedural issues
that arise during international arbitration proceedings. Part D
explores a wide range of post-award annulment and enforcement
topics. Part E briefly examines the effect of legislation in many U.S.
states to encourage international arbitration. Finally, Part F
addresses non-arbitral ADR devices, including mediation and
conciliation, and lesser known but increasingly utilized processes. 4
B. A Primer on the Framework of
International Commercial Arbitration
International commercial arbitration is a private,
nongovernmental process, fashioned by contract, 5 which provides
for the binding resolution of a dispute through the decision of one or
more private individuals selected by the disputants. 6 Historically
lauded as a confidential, cost-efficient method of dispute resolution 7
that avoids the pitfalls of litigating in national courts, 8 its contractual
nature provides the parties flexibility to customize its processes.' 9
Unlike litigation, parties can (and do) predetermine the arbitration's
procedural rules and applicable substantive law.2" In addition,
arbitration provides greater predictability and certainty than
transnational litigation through time-honored enforcement
14. This article focuses solely on international business disputes. Fora such as the World
Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which govern
investor-state arbitration, NAFTA and CAFTA related arbitration, and International Trade
Commission investigations, are outside its scope.
15. Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International
Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 90 (1995); see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (noting "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the
parties").
16. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
17. Franck, supra note 10, at 500.
18. See Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile,
2005 J. DisP. RESOL. 323, 327.
19. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (noting that "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see
fit").
20. See Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V and VII of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J.
43, 44-45 (2002).
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mechanisms established by international treaties. 2' Though still the
favored form of international dispute resolution, the rising costs and
sluggish pace of arbitration have led some companies to shy away
from this method in recent years.22 Even so, with globalization
increasing at a breakneck pace, one can anticipate that the future will
see more businesses joining the international stream of commerce for
the first time. Seeking to minimize the uncertainty that comes with
navigating in foreign terrain, it is likely that the bulk of these
businesses will include arbitration clauses in their contracts to limit
risk and protect investment.23
Such a conclusion is supported by reports that over the past
decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of arbitration to
resolve international commercial disputes.24  In fact, empirical
research reveals that approximately 90 percent of international
21. The two most prominent international commercial arbitration treaties are the New York
Convention, supra note 7, discussed infra, and the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention], also
discussed infra.
22. See Dunham, supra note 18, at 345-46 ("International arbitration typically lasts over
four years and costs a substantial amount of money."); cf New Study, supra note 9, at 12 (noting
that "international arbitration is at least as expensive as transnational litigation for medium and
small cases, but it may be a 'better value' for larger, more complex cases"). Another criticism of
international commercial arbitration is that it has become increasingly "judicialized" or
"Americanized," meaning both that arbitrations tend to be conducted with litigation-style
formality and that they are more often subject to judicial intervention. See generally
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND
UNIFORMITY? (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1993) (containing commentaries on
the judicialization of arbitration). Some commentators note that the American legal tradition has
an influence on international commercial arbitration, but have doubts as to whether the system
has become "judicialized" or "Americanized." See Dunham, supra note 18, at 345-47. See
generally Helmer, supra note 4 (examining several ways in which international commercial
arbitration might be considered Americanized, but concluding that the significant American
influence falls short of Americanization). But see generally Alford, supra note 13 (arguing that
international arbitration is becoming Americanized, though acknowledging that several other
countries influence international arbitration).
23. See William S. Fiske, Comment, Should Small and Medium-Size American Businesses
"Going Global" Use International Commercial Arbitration?, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 455, 459
(2005) ("Ensuring the enforceability of arbitration clauses and awards through treaties provides
the lifeblood for international commercial contracts."). However, there are circumstances where
litigation may be a better choice than arbitration. Id. at 481. For example, litigation may be more
efficient than arbitration when "simple manufactured goods are traded between two common law
countries." Id. at 484.
24. See TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 341 app. 1 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter
TOWARDS A SCIENCE] (demonstrating that between 1993 and 2003, there was nearly a 100
percent increase in the number of international arbitration proceedings administered by leading
institutions).
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economic contracts include an arbitration clause.25 Similarly, recent
years have seen an increase in the number of arbitration institutions
worldwide.26 With billions of dollars at stake in many worldwide
disputes, international commercial arbitration is here to stay.27
1. The Evolution of International Commercial Arbitration
The origins of commercial arbitration date back to 13th century
England, when merchants sat as private judges in "piepowder courts"
and on tribunals of guilds and trading companies. 28 The modem era
saw commercial arbitration develop in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries through such vehicles as trade associations, shipping and
stock exchanges, and chambers of commerce. 29  The concept of
international arbitration dates back to the days of ancient Greece."
Its modem roots can be found in the Jay Treaty of 1794,31 which
created commissions enabling British creditors to arbitrate claims
against U.S. nationals. 2 Many of the arbitral rules and procedures
established in the Jay Treaty are similar to those utilized in
proceedings today.3 International arbitration made additional strides
during the modem era with the post-American-Civil-War Alabama
cases, in which arbitral tribunals administered proceedings involving
allegations that England violated its promise of neutrality during the
war by destroying U.S. commercial vessels.34 In the modem era,
international arbitration also advanced with the establishment of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the dawn of the twentieth
century.35
However, the first truly international commercial arbitration
system began operating in 1923, when the International Chamber of
25. Id. at 59.
26. Helmer, supra note 4, at 38.
27. See Franck, supra note 10, at 499 & n.l, 500.
28. BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 31-32.
29. Id. at 32.
30. See William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 41-42 (1996) [hereinafter Slate, Institutions].
31. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
32. Alford, supra note 13, at 72.
33. See id. at 72-74 & nn. 13-21. For a discussion of pertinent procedural topics in inter-
national commercial arbitration, see infra Part C. 1.
34. See Alford, supra note 13, at 74-75.
35. See id.
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Commerce ("ICC")36  established its International Court of
Arbitration.37  During the first twenty years of its existence, most of
the cases administered by the ICC were resolved through
conciliation. 3' During this time dissatisfaction with international
arbitration was rampant. The 1927 Geneva Convention,39 which set
the framework for the enforcement of international arbitral awards,
proved to be inadequate and full of shortcomings. 41 Most
discomfiting to parties was the Geneva Convention's requirement of
"double exequatur," whereby an arbitral award had to be confirmed
in the country in which it was rendered before the courts of another
country could enforce the award.'
Thus, in 1953, the ICC proposed that the United Nations adopt a
new system to replace the 1927 Geneva Convention.42 What resulted
was the 1958 adoption of a groundbreaking international treaty,
formally titled the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention").43 This new
treaty vastly improved upon the Geneva Convention by providing a
set of rules for the recognition and enforcement of international
arbitral awards.' The United States acceded to the New York
36. An organization founded in 1919, the ICC is a non-governmental "voice of world
business championing the global economy as a force for economic growth, job creation and
prosperity." See ICC International Court of Arbitration - The World Business Organization,
http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
37. See ICC International Court of Arbitration - Introduction, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/
english/intro-courtlintroduction.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). Other international arbitration
institutions, such as the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), were in existence before 1923. See JACK J. COE, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT 213-15 (1997). However, the ICC Court is credited as being the first
institution with global reach. BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
38. BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 32. Conciliation, an ADR process similar to
mediation, is discussed infra Part F.
39. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S.
302.
40. See Davis, supra note 20, at 54-55.
41. Id. at45.
42. See G6linas, supra note 6, at 117.
43. New York Convention, supra note 7.
44. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) ("The goal of the
Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it,
was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed
and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."); see also Slate, Institutions, supra
note 30, at 44 ("The New York Convention provides for mutual recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards by contracting states, and limits the defenses that may be raised in opposition to
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Convention in 1970, and legislation implementing the Convention
can be found in chapter two of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA").
45
A country that ratifies or accedes to the New York Convention
must recognize and enforce arbitral awards entered in foreign
territories or "not considered as domestic ... in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought. ' 46  Furthermore, the
Convention requires the participating country to recognize arbitral
awards as binding and to enforce them in conformity with its laws,
subject to a few narrow exceptions.47 The New York Convention has
a jurisdictional component as well, obliging national courts to
recognize the validity of arbitration agreements and referring parties
to arbitration when they have entered into a valid agreement to
arbitrate and one of the parties has requested arbitration.48
The New York Convention applies to all foreign arbitration
agreements, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute and the
citizenship of the parties.49 However, countries can limit application
of its enforcement requirements, on the basis of reciprocity, to
awards rendered in other contracting states.5 ° Under the New York
Convention, reciprocity refers to the place where the arbitration is
conducted and the award is rendered, not to the parties'
nationalities.' The United States and many other Convention
the confirmation of an award, in an attempt to eliminate duplicative litigation following an
arbitration.").
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000).
46. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38; see
also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 21 n.102 (2d ed. 2001) ('Recognition' of an arbitral award refers to giving
preclusive effect to the award, usually to bar relitigation of the claims that were arbitrated;
'enforcement' refers to the invocation of coercive judicial remedies to fulfil [sic] the arbitral
award."). A more detailed discussion of the New York Convention's enforcement scheme is set
forth infra Part D. 1.
47. New York Convention, supra note 7, arts. III, V, 21 U.S.T. at 2519-20, 330 U.N.T.S. at
40, 42. For a discussion of these exceptions, see infra Part D. 1.
48. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 11(1) & (3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
38, 40.
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 1(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
51. See E.A.S.T., Inc. v. MN Alaia, 876 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The principle of
reciprocity is thus concerned with the forum in which the arbitration will occur and whether that
forum state is a signatory to the Convention-not whether both parties to the dispute are nationals
of signatory states."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 487 cmt. b (1987) (noting that for states that adhere to the New York Convention
subject to reciprocity, "the critical element is the place of the award").
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signatories have made this reservation. 2 Moreover, in accordance
with the Convention, many ratifying states have limited its
application to legal relationships regarded as "commercial" by the
laws of the respective state. 3  The United States' commercial
reservation provides that "[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral
award arising out of a legal relationship ... which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement
described in section 2 of [the FAA], falls under the Convention. 5 4
As one of the most successful mechanisms in place to promote
international trade, the New York Convention has been a resounding
success story. 5 However, its scope is limited, as it primarily focuses
on creating a uniform standard for recognition and enforcement of
the arbitration agreement and award, rather than the conduct of the
proceedings. 6 Similarly, the New York Convention does not include
uniform rules for the procedure of enforcement, leaving that standard
to national arbitration laws.57 While the text of the Convention might
be improved by introducing uniform procedural rules, it is highly
52. At the time this Article was written, 138 countries were contracting parties to the New
York Convention, the most recent signatory being the United Arab Emirates. For a list of the
member countries, including those that have made reciprocity reservations, see UNCITRAL,
Status 1958-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Status]. The U.S. reservation provides, in relevant part, that the
United States "will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State." New York
Convention, supra note 7, 21 U.S.T. at 2566.
53. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
For a list of the member countries that have declared the commercial reservation, see Status,
supra note 52.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). Section 2 of the FAA, as described in the commercial
reservation, refers to "any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce." Id. § 2. Thus, even matters such as consumer and employment arbitration can be
construed as falling within the scope of the New York Convention in the United States. See
Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 253-55 (2006).
55. G61inas, supra note 6, at 117.
56. See John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the
FederalArbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 24 (2000).
57. See U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), ENFORCING ARBITRATION
AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 4, U.N. Sales No.
E.99.V.2 (1998), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/
NYCDay-e.pdf.
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unrealistic that consensus could be reached by all of the contracting
states. 8
Concerned with the limited scope of the New York Convention,
Latin American countries and the United States sought to harmonize
both arbitral processes and the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards on a regional level. The result was the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration ("Panama
Convention").59 While the Panama Convention is similar to the New
York Convention, there are some notable differences. Because the
drafters of the Panama Convention sought to promote uniformity of
arbitral procedure,6" if parties do not agree to specific procedural
rules to govern the arbitration, the rules of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission ("IACAC Rules") will apply.61
In addition, the Panama Convention does not offer a reciprocity
reservation like the New York Convention62 and only applies to
arbitration agreements as to commercial transactions.63 Although the
Panama Convention has nowhere near the same global effect as the
New York Convention, it nevertheless plays a vital role in promoting
international trade in the Western Hemisphere.64 Seventeen Western
Hemisphere countries have ratified the Panama Convention since its
adoption,65 including the United States.66
58. Id. An additional protocol for procedural rules that may be adopted by some, but not all,
contracting states should be avoided, as it "would create a situation of two categories of New
York Convention States." Id.
59. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 5-7; supra note 21. The Panama Convention also sought
to quell long-running hostility and suspicion towards international arbitration in Latin American
countries. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 13-15.
60. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 11.
61. Panama Convention, supra note 21, art. 3, at 337.
62. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 42-43.
63. Panama Convention, supra note 21, art. 1, at 336. For a detailed summary of all of the
differences between the Panama Convention and the New York Convention, see Bowman, supra
note 56, at 24-69.
64. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 179-81. In fact, under U.S. implementing legislation,
when the majority of the parties to an arbitration agreement are citizens of a state or states that
have (1) ratified or acceded to the Panama Convention and (2) are member states of the
Organization of American States, the Panama Convention shall take priority over the New York
Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 305(1) (2000).
65. See Office of International Law, B-35: Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2007).
66. The United States acceded to the Panama Convention in 1990. Legislation
implementing the Convention can be found in Chapter 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 301-307 (2000).
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In the interest of international comity, the United States
government has taken a supportive stance toward international
commercial arbitration. Not only has Congress passed legislation
implementing the New York and Panama Conventions, the Supreme
Court has consistently championed international arbitration since its
decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.67 In enforcing an arbitration
agreement between two parties to an international commercial
contract, Justice Stewart wrote:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in
which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is
.. an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of
the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction. Furthermore, such a
provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the
agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the
interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the
problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would not
only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly
and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages.68
Judicial support for international commercial arbitration has endured
since Scherk, as the Supreme Court has continually recognized that
arbitration plays a necessary role in promoting international trade.69
Although international commercial arbitration has its roots in
Western Europe and the United States, it is hardly a regional
phenomenon anymore. Asia, particularly China, has become the
world's leading site, in terms of the number of new cases filed each
year, for parties to conduct international commercial arbitrations."
Even regions of the world with long-standing distrust and hostility
67. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
68. Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
69. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539
(1995) ("If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have a
role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements."); see
also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryslcr-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-31 (1985).
70. Philip J. McConnaughay, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN ASIA, at xxv, xxviii (Philip J. McConnaughay & Thomas B. Ginsburg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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towards arbitration have begun to embrace its benefits.71  Most
notably, with the help of increased governmental support for
arbitration, parties from Central and Eastern Europe and Latin
America are no longer the exception and have joined the
mainstream.72
2. Institutional Arbitration
Institutional arbitration, as its name suggests, "is that which is
administered by any one of the existing specialist arbitral institutions
under its own rules of arbitration. ' ' 73  To obtain the services of an
arbitral institution, the parties must agree to do so specifically. Not
surprisingly, the agreement to utilize an arbitral institution most often
takes the form of a forum selection clause in the original contract
between the parties.74 However, parties can also agree to use an
institution by entering into a specific submission agreement at the
time a dispute arises. 75  The fact that the majority of large multi-
national corporations engaged in international arbitration employ
established institutions to administer their arbitrations suggests that
there are certain advantages to institutional arbitration. 76  For the
most part, this assumption is true. Although there can be
disadvantages to using an institution, such as costly administrative
fees and procedural delays,77 there are many benefits.
71. See Alford, supra note 13, at 78-79.
72. See id.
73. Slate, Institutions, supra note 30, at 47.
74. See INT'L TRADE CTR., ARBITRATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How
TO SETTLE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 57 (2001). A typical forum selection clause for
parties engaging in institutional arbitration might look as follows:
All disputes arising in connection with the present contract or in relation thereto as well
as any other agreement signed or to be entered into in relation with the present contract
shall be finally settled under the Arbitration Rules of. . . [name of the institution
chosen] by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules.
The arbitration shall take place in [mention the place], [mention the country].
The language(s) of the arbitration shall be ....
Id. at 153 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). For examples of standard clauses
recommended by arbitral institutions, see id. at 157-63.
75. Id. at 57.
76. See New Study, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that "over 75% of the companies that use
international arbitration use administered arbitration under the auspices of an established
arbitration institution" and that "[t]he most often cited reasons for this are reputation of the
institution, convenience, familiarity with proceedings, [and] an understanding of the costs and
fees").
77. See BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 36.
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First, and perhaps most importantly, institutional arbitration
provides the parties with "convenience, security and administrative
effectiveness"78  while reducing the risk of "procedural
breakdowns. '79 As one author notes:
Before a dispute has arisen, it is generally very difficult to
ascertain what the exact nature of the dispute will be, what
kind of procedure will be most appropriate, what
contingencies will have to be taken into account and
whether both sides will cooperate to get the matter resolved.
Negotiating and drafting an arbitration clause that covers all
these considerations is a difficult, time-consuming and
costly exercise. The use of recognized model arbitration
rules ensures that the process will take place, that it will be
reasonably fair and efficient, that it will lead to a decision,
and that this decision will be enforceable.8"
Thus, institutional arbitration allows parties to take advantage of well
designed systems administered by impartial professionals.
A second important advantage is that institutions can assist in
selecting and appointing a neutral arbitrator. This is critical to the
fairness and legitimacy of the entire arbitration process.8' Institutions
may be called upon to review challenges to an appointed arbitrator or
assist parties when they fail to agree on the arbitrator to be
appointed.82 Without an institution to help resolve such issues,
parties may find it difficult to resolve the issues themselves.83
A third advantage of institutional arbitration is that the prestige
of the institution can strengthen the credibility of an award, thus
facilitating voluntary compliance and enforcement.84 If the losing
party does not attempt annulment proceedings and complies with the
award, the winning party will likely not have to resort to the court
78. Id. (emphasis omitted).
79. BORN, supra note 46, at 12.
80. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 36.
81. Slate, Institutions, supra note 30, at 56.
82. Id. at 56-57 (citing Michael F. Hoellering, Managing International Commercial
Arbitration: The Institution's Role, DisP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 15).
83. Id. at 57.
84. BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 36; see also BORN, supra note 46, at 12 (noting
that "the institution lends its standing to any award that is rendered, which may enhance the
likelihood of voluntary compliance and judicial enforcement").
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system to enforce the award, ultimately resulting in lower transaction
costs for both sides of the dispute.85
Each arbitral institution independently has developed rules
establishing a basic framework for the process and timetable of the
arbitration.86 While each institution has its own set of rules, most
rules are quite similar. As mentioned above, it is common for such
rules to empower the institution to select arbitrators in certain
disputes and to resolve challenges to arbitrators.87 Furthermore,
typical rules authorize the institution to designate the place of
arbitration and set or influence the arbitrators' fees.88 While many
institutions give the parties freedom to select any arbitrator(s), some
require them to choose the arbitrator(s) from a provided list. 9 Thus,
attorneys should research an institution's arbitrator selection rules
before finalizing a forum selection clause in an international
commercial contract. In addition, when choosing an appropriate
institution, parties should determine in advance whether a particular
arbitral institution has experience in the relevant commercial sector.9 °
The leading international arbitration institutions are the ICC,
through its International Court of Arbitration ("ICC Court"), the
American Arbitration Administration ("AAA"), and the London
Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA").9  However, with
arbitration's expansion throughout the globe, it is imperative for
practitioners to be familiar with other notable institutions that have
seen tremendous growth in recent years, such as the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
85. There are many other advantages to institutional arbitration, from the availability of
physical facilities and support services for the proceedings to institutional assistance in
encouraging reluctant parties to proceed. See KATHRYN HELNE NICKERSON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION pt. I.E.1.a (2005), http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html; see also Slate,
Institutions, supra note 30, at 52-59. It is not the objective of this article to discuss these
advantages in detail. Suffice it to say that there are many compelling reasons why major, multi-
national corporations prefer to use arbitral institutions to administer their international
commercial dispute.
86. BORN, supra note 46, at 11.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 59.
90. Id. at 58-59.
91. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. For a comprehensive list of arbitration
institutions, see id. app. 2.
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("CIETAC") and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
("HKIAC").
92
The remainder of this section provides an overview of these
leading arbitral institutions. All of these institutions have easily
accessible websites which make available their procedural rules and
thoroughly explain all the services they provide. 93 Thus, since this
information is readily available, what follows is not an exhaustive
comparison of competing institutions and all of their procedural
rules, but rather a brief survey to identify their central characteristics.
a. International Chamber of Commerce
The ICC Court is considered the world's leading international
commercial arbitration institution.94 The ICC is located in Paris, yet
administers arbitrations throughout the world.95 In recent years, the
majority of parties to arbitrations administered by the ICC have been
from countries outside of Western Europe,96 demonstrating that there
is widespread confidence in the institution's ability to administer fair
and efficient proceedings.
The ICC's Rules of Arbitration ("ICC Rules") govern all
international arbitrations administered by the institution, and were
most recently revised in 1998. 9" Under these rules, the ICC is
92. Other notable international commercial arbitration institutions are the Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Singapore International Arbitration
Centre, and The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board.
93. See infra notes 95, 107, 118, 128, 136.
94. BORN, supra note 46, at 13. The more significant arbitrations between truly
international (non-American) parties still take place outside of the United States, mostly in
Europe. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 42. These cases involve the largest amounts of money and
high political stakes. Id.
95. See COE, supra note 37, at 208. Until recently, the ICC required arbitrations to take
place at its Paris facilities, but it has now expanded to other parts of the world. Dunham, supra
note 18, at 332. The most common sites for ICC arbitrations are France, Switzerland, England,
other Western European states, and the United States. See Thomas H. Webster, Evolving
Principles in Enforcing Awards Subject to Annulment Proceedings, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 201, 205
(2006). In addition, ICC arbitrations are held in such regions as Asia and the Middle East.
Dunham, supra note 18, at 332. Over the past five years, the ICC has averaged approximately
564 arbitration filings per year, most of which are international. See BORN, supra note 46, at 13
(noting that most cases filed with the ICC are international disputes, and that many involve large
sums of money); Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, http://www.hkiac.org/HKIAC/
HKIAC English/main.html (follow "Statistics" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2007)
[hereinafter HKIAC Institutional Arbitration Comparison Chart].
96. BORN, supra note 46, at 13.
97. ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 15 (1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/
arbitration/pdf documents/rules/rules arbenglish.pdf.
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intimately involved in the administration of individual arbitrations
and is responsible for such things as service of the Request for
Arbitration and other submissions on the parties,98 appointing
arbitrators if the parties cannot agree upon them,99 considering
challenges to the independence of arbitrators,' 0 reviewing "Terms of
Reference," which describe the issues and procedures for
arbitrations,' and most notably, reviewing arbitral awards for
defects in form and possible substantive errors."2 The ICC Court,
which is not really a "court" but an administrative body, plays a
supervisory role under the ICC Rules. 11 3 This quality-control system
sets the ICC apart from other arbitration institutions, and, as one
commentator has suggested, "may explain the infrequency with
which national courts have set aside ICC awards.""'
b. American Arbitration Association
Founded in 1926, the AAA is the leading arbitration institution
in the United States and is headquartered in New York.0 5 The AAA
established the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
("ICDR"),'10 6 its international division, in 1996, and later opened a
European office in Dublin, Ireland to promote and expand its
arbitration services on a global scale.0 7 "The ICDR's international
98. Id. arts. 4(5), 5(4).
99. Id. arts. 8(2), 9.
100. Id. art. 11.
101. Id. art. 18. The "Terms of Reference" procedure "has been compared to a pre-hearing
conference and described as an opportunity for the arbitrators to get to know each other and
counsel, and to become familiar with the case." Slate, Institutions, supra note 30, at 48.
102. ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 27. In reviewing the award, however, the ICC Court may "draw
its attention to points of substance," but may not "affect[] the Arbitral Tribunal's liberty of
decision." Id.
103. See id. art. 1(2).
104. COE, supra note 37, at 209.
105. BORN, supra note 46, at 16.
106. To access the website for the ICDR, see International Centre for Dispute Resolution,
http://www.adr.org/International (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
107. About the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=28745 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007) [hereinafter About the ICDR]. The Dublin office
opened in 2001 and is credited "with . . . steadily increasing willingness among European
businesses and within the European legal community to use ICDR services." See WILLIAM K.
SLATE II, AM. ARB. ASS'N, 2004 PRESIDENT'S LETTER 4 (2005), http://www.adr.org/
si.asp?id=3661 [hereinafter SLATE, 2004 PRESIDENT'S LETTER]. In February 2006, the ICDR
announced plans to open two additional international offices, in Mexico City and Singapore.
WILLIAM K. SLATE II, AM. ARB. ASS'N, 2005 PRESIDENT'S LETTER & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
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system is premised on its ability to move matters forward, facilitate
communications, ensure that qualified arbitrators and mediators are
appointed, control costs, understand cultural sensitivities, resolve
procedural impasses, and properly interpret and apply its
International Arbitration and Mediation Rules."1 °8
The ICDR maintains its own International Dispute Resolution
Procedures, which include International Arbitration Rules ("AAA
Rules") designed specifically for all international arbitrations."°9 If
the parties' arbitration agreement provides for dispute resolution by
the ICDR but fails to designate specific rules, the AAA Rules apply
by default."0 However, the AAA will administer cases pursuant to
rules other than its own, such as the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules
("UNCITRAL Rules") or the IACAC Rules, provided that the parties
agree to these rules in their arbitration agreement."' Furthermore,
while the AAA Rules are generally applicable to international
business disputes, parties can also contract for arbitration under other
rules promulgated by the AAA, such as its Construction Industry
Dispute Resolution Procedures, Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules,
and Patent Arbitration Rules." 2
Unlike the ICC Rules, the AAA Rules entail less administrative
involvement in the arbitration process." 3 In addition, while the AAA
recently eclipsed the ICC with respect to the amount of international
arbitration filings, most of its cases involve an American party."4
7 (2006), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4301. The Mexico City office is now open for business.
About the ICDR, supra.
108. International Centre for Dispute Resolution, supra note 106.
109. See AM. ARB. ASS'N INT'L ARB. RULES art. 1 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 2006).
110. Id. art. 1(1).
111. AM. ARB. ASS'N, PUBLIC SERVICE AT THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 52-
53 (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3448; see AM. ARB. ASS'N INT'L ARB.
RULES art. 1(1) ("Where parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate disputes ... without desig-
nating particular rules, the arbitration shall take place in accordance with these rules .... ").
112. AM. ARB. ASS'N INT'L ARB. RULES supp. procedures (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1999), available
at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28998. When parties agree to resolve international disputes
pursuant to industry specific arbitration rules, the Supplemental Procedures help to facilitate such
cases. Id.
113. See BORN, supra note 46, at 16-17 (noting that the AAA does not do such things as
receive or serve initial notices or requests for arbitration, require or review a Terms of Reference,
or review draft awards).
114. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 41-42 ("According to the leading authority in international
arbitration, AAA's number of truly international cases (cases where both parties are non-U.S.) is
'modest' and cannot compete with the ICC numbers."). Over the past five years, the AAA has
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The fact that the minority of the AAA's international cases are
between non-U.S. parties may be a result of the possibility that such
parties "are often reluctant to agree to arbitration under AAA rules,
fearing parochial predisposition and unfamiliarity with international
practice."'1 5 Considering, however, that the AAA's foray into the
international field is a relatively recent development, its recent
expansion to Europe is not going unnoticed by the international
business community." 6
c. London Court of International Arbitration
Founded in 1892, the LCIA is the oldest of the major arbitration
institutions, and, while London-based, administers arbitrations
throughout the world."7 Like the ICC Court, the LCIA is not an
adjudicative court in the traditional sense; instead, it is primarily
administrative and supervisory in nature. The LCIA is no longer
considered an exclusively English organization, and now more than
70 percent of the cases filed with the LCIA involve non-U.K.
parties."'
Unlike other institutional rules, the LCIA's rules for arbitration
("LCIA Rules") set forth the powers of an LCIA arbitral tribunal in
detail.' Some prominent powers given to arbitrators include the
ability to order discovery 2 ° and security for legal costs.' 2' Moreover,
under the LCIA Rules, although parties can nominate arbitrators who
are not on the LCIA's roster, the LCIA has the sole ability to appoint
averaged approximately 630 international arbitration filings per year. See HKIAC Institutional
Arbitration Comparison Chart, supra note 95.
115. BORN, supra note 46, at 17.
116. Cf SLATE, 2004 PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 107, at 6-7 (discussing several
factors contributing to increased activity in the AAA's international operations).
117. COE, supra note 37, at 213.
118. London Court of International Arbitration, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.lcia.org (follow "FAQ" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter LCIA
FAQ]. Over the past five years, the LCIA has averaged approximately 94 international arbi-
tration filings per year. See HKIAC Institutional Arbitration Comparison Chart, supra note 95.
This number includes domestic arbitration filings. Id.
119. BORN, supra note 46, at 15 (citing LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. RULES arts. 14, 15,
19, 20, 21, 22 (1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/ARB-folder/ARBDOWNLOADS/
ENGLISH/rules.pdf).
120. LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. RULES arts. 22.1(d)-(e).
121. Id. art. 25.2. An example of security for legal costs is "a deposit or bank guarantee
securing the estimated amounts which an unsuccessful claimant would be liable to reimburse to a
successful respondent for its costs of legal representation." BORN, supra note 46, at 15.
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arbitrators for the proceedings.'22 In addition, in contrast to the ICC
Rules, the LCIA Rules do not allow for the institution to scrutinize
arbitral awards and only permit parties to request correction of
computational, clerical, or typographical errors in awards.'23
However, while these rules might appear somewhat more detailed
and less flexible than those of other institutions, the LCIA permits
the parties to arbitrate under its rules or pursuant to the UNCITRAL
Rules. 124
d. China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission
Established in the 1950s to settle disputes between foreign
companies and Chinese firms,'25 the CIETAC has emerged in the
past decade as the top international commercial arbitration institution
with respect to annual number of filings,'26 and administers the
majority of arbitrations in China in which foreigners participate.'27
Headquartered in Beijing with two sub-commissions in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, the CIETAC is independent of any governmental agencies
in China and has "19 liaison offices in different regions and specific
business sectors to provide parties with handy arbitration advice."'28
However, unlike the leading institutions, CIETAC arbitrations are
administered only in China.'29
In order to offer the parties increased autonomy while
resembling other leading international arbitration practices, the
CIETAC Arbitration Rules ("CIETAC Rules") have been revised six
122. LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. RULES art. 5.5; see also London Court of International
Arbitration, About the LCIA, http://www.lcia.org/ (follow "LCIA" hyperlink; then follow
"Arbitrators" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
123. See LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. RULES art. 27.1.
124. See LCIA FAQ, supra note 118.
125. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 62.
126. Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration in China, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
ASIA, supra note 70, at 1, 18-19 [hereinafter Tao, Arbitration in China]. Over the past five years,
CIETAC has averaged approximately 791 filings per year. See HKIAC Institutional Arbitration
Comparison Chart, supra note 95. This number includes domestic arbitration filings. Id.
127. See Slate, Institutions, supra note 30, at 49-50.
128. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Introduction,
http://www.cietac.org (follow "English" hyperlink; then follow "Introduction" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter CIETAC Introduction].
129. See CHINA INT'L ECON. AND TRADE ARB. COMM'N ARB. RULES art. 2(8) (2005),
available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/rules/
rules.htm.
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times over the past fifty years. 3 ° Before the most recent revisions in
2005, the CIETAC Rules prevented parties from selecting arbitrators
from outside of the panel maintained by the CIETAC.' 3' The current
rules allow parties to nominate and appoint arbitrators from outside
of the CIETAC's panel, provided the appointment is confirmed by
the Chairman of the CIETAC and in accordance with Chinese
arbitration law. 3 2 The major difference between the other leading
institutions and the CIETAC is that arbitrations at the CIETAC allow
for a unique combination of arbitration and conciliation, which can
ultimately lead to a renewal of positive relations between the
disputing parties.'33 Considering that the rapid pace of foreign
investment and economic development in China will invariably
result in an increase in disputes, the CIETAC has potential to
eventually garner a reputation on the same level as the ICC, AAA,
and LCIA.
e. Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
A non-profit company, the HKIAC began operations in 1985
and has since grown to become one of the busiest arbitration
institutions in the world.'34 The HKIAC and a progressive legal
regime have helped create a vibrant community for international
arbitration in Hong Kong.'35 The HKIAC recommends parties utilize
its Procedures for the Administration of International Arbitration,
which incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules by reference.'36 However,
130. See CIETAC Introduction, supra note 128.
131. See Tao, Arbitration in China, supra note 126, at 31.
132. CHINA INT'L ECON. AND TRADE ARB. COMM'N ARB. RULES art. 21(2).
133. See id. art. 40.
134. David Sandborg, Arbitration in Hong Kong, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN ASIA, supra note 70, at 55, 59 [hereinafter Sandborg, Arbitration in Hong
Kong]. Over the past five years, the HKIAC has averaged approximately 295 filings per year.
See HKIAC Institutional Arbitration Comparison Chart, supra note 95.
135. Sandborg, Arbitration in Hong Kong, supra note 134, at 55. Although the 1997
reversion of sovereignty to Mainland China initially created some problems with enforcement of
arbitration awards between Hong Kong and the Mainland, those problems have been resolved.
Id. Moreover, the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Island and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1371, intends that that the current English law and practice
applies until 2047. See COE, supra note 37, at 216.
136. See HONG KONG INT'L ARB. CTR. PROCEDURES FOR THE ADMIN. OF INT'L ARB. arts.
I(1)-(2) (2005), available at http://www.hkiac.org/HKIAC/pdf/Ruies/HKIAC%20Procedures%
20forO/o2Olnternational%20Arbitration.pdf.
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parties are free to agree on other rules to govern their international
arbitration with the HKIAC, including the rules of any other arbitral
institution. 137  Finally, while most international arbitrations
administered by the HKIAC take place in Hong Kong, the HKIAC
allows for an arbitration to take place in a different location, so long
as the parties bear the costs of the off-site administration. 38 Overall,
the HKIAC provides parties ample flexibility and autonomy, with
only minor administrative interference.
3. Ad Hoc Arbitration
If parties do not use an institution to administer their dispute,
and instead stipulate to other rules of procedure, by default they
engage in "ad hoc" arbitration.139  As arbitration is a matter of
contract, parties who do not choose the supervision of an institution
are permitted to define any and all of the procedural rules to be
applied in the proceeding. Often, parties in an ad hoc arbitration will
agree to proceed under the UNCITRAL Rules, 4' adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1976 to develop harmonious international
economic relations between "countries with different legal, social
and economic systems."'' The UNCITRAL Rules were principally
designed to facilitate ad hoc arbitration on a global scale.'42 Should
the parties' arbitration agreement fail to provide for any applicable
rules whatsoever for conducting the arbitration, the parties generally
137. See Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Information Services, http://
www.hkiac.org/HKIAC/HKIAC-English/main.html (follow "Services" hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 8, 2007).
138. See HONG KONG INT'L ARB. CTR. PROCEDURES FOR THE ADMIN. OF INT'L ARB. art.
1(5).
139. See BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 35 ("Historically, the parties used to spell
out the procedures in the arbitration agreement, and when the dispute arises jointly select the
arbitrator(s) and work out the details of the procedure together with the tribunal which under most
laws is empowered to devise its own procedure."); INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 65.
140. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) ARB. RULES (1976), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
141. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/31/ares31.htm (follow "AIRES/31/98" hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 8, 2007).
142. See William K. Slate II et al., UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law): Its Workings in International Arbitration and a New Model Conciliation Law, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 73, 79 (2004) [hereinafter Slate et al., UNCITRAL].
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are bound by the arbitration and procedural rules of the country
where the arbitration takes place.'43
In ad hoc arbitrations, parties often pre-select the arbitrator(s),
who must then resolve the dispute without the help of an institutional
administration.'" As noted above, parties who disagree on the
appointment of the arbitrator(s) are left in more of a bind than those
utilizing institutions. Fortunately, the UNCITRAL Rules address
this problem by allowing parties to agree upon an "appointing
authority" to choose the arbitrator(s).'45 Parties usually will
designate an appointing authority in the arbitration agreement,
whether or not the UNCITRAL Rules are to apply.'46 If the parties
fail to do so, arbitration laws in many countries permit national
courts to appoint arbitrators.'47
Though it may not provide as much certainty and security as
institutional arbitration, ad hoc arbitration can provide tangible
benefits to parties engaged in international commercial arbitration.
Typically, ad hoc arbitration is more flexible, less expensive, and
more confidential than institutional arbitration.'48 Ad hoc arbitration
may be a worthwhile consideration when the arbitration agreement is
made after the dispute arises, as the parties will have a clearer vision
of how to tailor the process to the specific nature of the dispute.'49
However, drafting an arbitration agreement after a dispute rears its
head requires a certain amount of cooperation between the parties,
143. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 67. When parties fail to agree on the arbitral situs,
the arbitrators must determine the proper situs. BORN, supra note 46, at 579-80.
144. BORN, supra note 46, at 12.
145. See U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) ARB. RULES art. 6. If parties
cannot agree on an appointing authority, the UNCITRAL Rules allow either party to request the
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to designate one. Id. art.
6(2).
146. BORN, supra note 46, at 12. For a fee, most of the leading arbitration institutions
(including the ICC, the AAA, and the LCIA) will act as an appointing authority in ad hoc
arbitrations, and "will usually deal with the matter of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal just
as rapidly as it would have done if the case had been managed under its own arbitration rules."
INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 67.
147. BORN, supra note 46, at 12. For example, in actions subject to the New York
Convention in the United States, 9 U.S.C. § 206 provides that "[a] court having jurisdiction under
this chapter ... may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement."
9 U.S.C. § 206 (2000). Selecting the location of an ad hoc arbitration is of vital importance,
because the national law of the place of arbitration determines any obstacles that arise during the
arbitral process. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 65.
148. BORN, supra note 46, at 12.
149. See BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 38.
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which can be difficult to achieve. 5 ' Ultimately, unless parties
already have extensive experience and familiarity with the nuances
of international commercial arbitration, institutional arbitration may
be worth the additional expense.
C. Procedural Issues in International Commercial Arbitration
Considering that the "personality" of international commercial
arbitration differs from that of transnational litigation, attorneys
making their first strides into this realm should be familiar with
many of the procedural characteristics of the typical international
arbitration. As a global creature of contract, international
commercial arbitration does not function under a uniform body of
procedural rules. Instead, as stated above, an arbitration can be
administered through a multitude of procedural possibilities,
including specific provisions agreed to by the parties in the
arbitration clause, procedural law governing the conduct of the
arbitration in the forum state, procedures promulgated by private
arbitral institutions, the UNCITRAL Rules, and case-specific
procedural rules determined by arbitrators when procedural standards
are not pre-specified.'51 An in-depth analysis of each procedural
facet of a standard international commercial arbitration could be the
exclusive subject of multiple and voluminous articles. Hence, what
follows in this section is a discussion of the general nature of
international commercial arbitration procedures, with emphasis on
several important and distinctive qualities.
International arbitration proceedings are subject to certain legal
standards, and in most cases, the governing procedural law will be
that of the arbitral situs.'52 The applicable procedural law may
control various procedural issues in an international arbitration, such
as the parties' autonomy to agree on substantive and procedural
150. Id. at 38-39.
151. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 90 & n.2.
152. BORN, supra note 46, at 413. The arbitral situs is "the place where the arbitration
proceedings will usually be conducted, the place whose law the parties intended to govern their
proceedings, and the place where any arbitral award will be made." Id. In rare cases, choice of
law issues may arise relating to the applicable procedural law. Id. In addition, many national
legal systems permit the parties to select the procedural law governing the arbitration. Id. at 427
n.2; see, e.g., Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru,
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 116, 120 (Eng.) ("There is ... no reason in theory which precludes parties
to agree that an arbitration shall be held at a place or in country X but subject to the procedural
laws of Y.").
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issues, pleading rules, evidentiary rules, and the conduct of
hearings.'53 However, strict requirements are rare, as most national
arbitration laws do not prescribe specific procedures and only cover
what occurs before and after the arbitration and how much courts
may support or interfere with the proceedings.154 Most often, parties
have autonomy to agree upon the procedures to govern the
arbitration, subject only to any mandatory requirements of the
applicable procedural law.155 Developed states, where international
arbitrations often take place, do not place burdensome mandatory
limitations on the nature of the proceedings.'56 Most jurisdictions
simply require that the arbitral proceedings satisfy some minimal
standards of due process, such as the right of the parties to be treated
equally.'57
Though parties have wide freedom to agree in advance to
detailed procedural rules, usually they do not do so.'58 Even if parties
agree to arbitrate pursuant to institutional rules, those rules do not
describe the actual proceedings in much detail and primarily are
concerned with ensuring that the process actually occurs and leads to
a decision.'59 Thus, the adoption of explicit procedures for an
international commercial arbitration is left to the parties or, when
they fail to agree, the arbitrators. 6 ' Under most national arbitration
laws and institutional arbitration rules, the international arbitral
tribunal has flexibility to tailor the procedures to the nature of the
dispute. 6' This is of vital importance, considering that parties to an
arbitration tend to disagree on at least some of the procedural issues
153. See BORN, supra note 46, at 412.
154. BOHR1NG-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 70.
155. BORN, supra note 46, at 434-35.
156. Id. at 436.
157. Id. at 436-37; BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 70.
158. BORN, supra note 46, at 437.
159. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 70.
160. Id.
161. See BORN, supra note 46, at 437. For example, the ICC Rules give the arbitral tribunal
wide discretion to develop procedures for the arbitration:
The proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules and,
where these Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the
Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules
of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration.
ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 15(1) (1998); see also id. art. 20 (providing the tribunal discretion in
establishing the facts of the case).
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in front of them. 162 Furthermore, to assist parties and arbitrators with
developing fair procedures for the arbitration, UNCITRAL has
published a document that lists and briefly describes "questions on
which appropriately timed decisions on organizing arbitral
proceedings may be useful.' 63
Given the lack of a uniform procedural standard in an
international commercial arbitration, the exact nature of the process
will depend on the legal traditions of the arbitrator(s) and the parties'
counsel, which often results in a blend of civil and common law
elements."6 Civil law elements, including the preference for written
over oral testimony, limited discovery and cross-examination of
witnesses, and efforts to minimize hearing time, dominate the
process in most cases. 165 In addition, like judges under the civil law
inquisitorial system, arbitrators take a more active role in questioning
than do common law judges. 66 This is not to suggest that common
law elements are a rarity. In fact, when the parties and/or
arbitrator(s) come from a common law background, discovery,
depositions, challenges to arbitrators, and other tactical maneuvers
can be commonplace in an international arbitration. 167 While there is
always potential for conflicting styles in international arbitration,
differences in approach may be mitigated through compromise
between the parties. 168  And, despite differences in legal
backgrounds, "[tihe typical international [commercial] arbitration,
whether influenced by the civil law or common law tradition, is
conducted in a formal, adversary hearing unadulterated by
techniques associated with conciliation or 'alternative dispute
resolution.' "169
162. BORN, supra note 46, at 438.
163. UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN 9/423,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf. The
Notes offer advice on a wide range of procedural concerns, such as the language and place of
arbitration, evidentiary matters, witnesses, and hearings.
164. BOHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 71.
165. See id. at 71-72; see also Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 92, 102-03.
166. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 91-92, 92 n.12. This questioning is usually for
clarification purposes. Id. at 97.
167. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 46.
168. COE, supra note 37, at 227.
169. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 91. In the standard hearing, the parties, their
attorneys, and the arbitrators are simply seated around a table. Id. at 95. The hearing goes
through several stages including brief opening remarks by counsel; testimony from fact witnesses
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The remainder of this section examines the distinctive manner in
which international arbitration treats three procedural components
vital to the administration of justice: discovery, witness examination,
and joinder and consolidation.
1. Limited Discovery
International arbitration is a melting pot of various procedural
traditions. When it comes to discovery, however, civil law traditions
generally frown upon the typical mass discovery routines of
American-style litigation.17 As opposed to "discovery," attorneys
with civil law backgrounds are used to "disclosure," wherein the
lawyers for each side simply produce the pertinent documents that
support their claim or defense.'71  The dearth of discovery in
international arbitration has traditionally been seen as an advantage
over litigation, as it reduces costs, speeds up the overall process, and
reduces the risk of the disclosure of business secrets.'72 However,
curtailing discovery reduces the ability of the parties to fully
comprehend all the relevant facts.'73
To that end, in recent years, American-style discovery has
gained adherents in the realm of international arbitration.'74 They
argue that discovery is "essential to prevent unfair surprise and to
inform the parties of the factual and legal issues before the
and, perhaps, experts; closing of the evidence; and legal argument and final pleadings. BUHRING-
UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 82. Complex cases are divided into shorter meetings due to the
difficulty of coordinating schedules of the arbitrators, counsel, witnesses, and experts for longer
than a few days at a time. Id. While the typical international commercial arbitration goes through
these formal stages, mediation and conciliation tactics are often woven into arbitrations in Asia.
See supra Part B.2.d.
170. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 50; see also Steven C. Bennett, Discovery Approaches Vary
in Global Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B 11 (noting that "it may be fairly said that
continental lawyers and judges abhor the kind of wasteful, costly and potentially abusive
discovery practices they associate with the American system").
171. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 50.
172. BORN, supra note 46, at 9; Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 102.
173. See Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery in
United States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 659, 668 & n.27 (2004) ("The
goal of a swift economic arbitration process that virtually eliminates the parties' ability to
discover the relevant facts is in perpetual tension with the obvious necessity of discovery to
enable the parties to put all the relevant facts before the arbitrator. It is most improbable that a
party will have all the relevant facts at its disposal before the dispute arises, and in arbitration it
will be virtually impossible to discover them regardless of how critical they are to the just
resolution of the case.").
174. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 102.
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arbitration begins so that the hearing can proceed efficiently."' 175
Thus, in recognizing its benefits, many civil lawyers and arbitrators
have begun to accept limited means of discovery in international
commercial arbitration. 17 6 In doing so, limited discovery blends the
common law approach, which seeks the production of categories of
relevant documents, and individual documents, with the civil law
approach, which demands that the documents be identified with
reasonable specificity. 1" Along these lines, international arbitrators
often order discovery of critical documents, but usually will refuse
broad requests.'78
Recognizing that procedures for pre-hearing discovery are only
outlined in general terms in both institutional rules and the
UNCITRAL Rules,'79 in June 1999, the International Bar Association
("IBA") adopted new Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Commercial Arbitration ("IBA Rules"). 8 ° The IBA
intended the Rules to be used in conjunction with institutional or ad
hoc rules or procedures governing international commercial
arbitrations. 8' In addition, the IBA Rules were designed to reflect
the procedures of many different legal systems and serve as a
resource to parties and arbitrators from different legal cultures.'82
Article 3 of the IBA Rules reflects the growing acceptance of limited
discovery in international commercial arbitration.'83 Under Article 3,
a party may submit to the arbitral tribunal a "Request to Produce"
documents,'84 which shall contain:
(a) (i) a description of a requested document sufficient to
identify it, or (ii) a description in sufficient detail (including
175. Id.
176. Helmer, supra note 4, at 50.
177. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
178. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 103.
179. See Bennett, supra note 170.
180. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EvID. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB. (1999), available
at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%20rules%20on%20the%20taking%2o"/2OEv
idence.pdf.
181. David W. Rivkin, Foreword to IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVID. IN INT'L
COMMERCIAL ARB. (1999).
182. Id.
183. Helmer, supra note 4, at 50-51.
184. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVID. IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB. art. 3.2.
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subject matter) of a narrow and specific requested category
of documents that are reasonably believed to exist;
(b) a description of how the documents requested are
relevant and material to the outcome of the case; and
(c) a statement that the documents requested are not in the
possession, custody or control of the requesting Party, and
of the reason why that Party assumes the documents
requested to be in the possession, custody or control of the
other Party.185
In requiring the proponent of the discovery request to make
these showings, Article 3 of the IBA Rules recognizes that
arbitration proceedings must be efficient and expeditious. The IBA
Rules also provide specific rules for fact witnesses, expert witnesses,
on site inspections, evidentiary hearings, and the admissibility of
evidence.'86 By adopting these rules in the arbitration clause, parties
to international commercial arbitrations can expect a higher degree
of procedural certainty and overall fairness.
Despite the rise in documentary discovery in international
commercial arbitration, other mechanisms of American-style
discovery, such as interrogatories and depositions, have not
infiltrated international arbitration.187 Arbitrators rarely order pre-
hearing depositions, a principle that follows from arbitration's
emphasis on writing. 88 Instead, parties and counsel have to rely on
the opponent's witnesses to submit written statements or affidavits in
order to learn the details of their testimony. 89 This is a fundamental
difference between the civil law tradition and typical American
common law practice. 9 °
Ultimately, it is critical to remember that any and all discovery
features of a typical international commercial arbitration can be
expanded via contract. 9' Thus, if parties want American-style
185. Id. art. 3.3.
186. See id. arts. 4-9.
187. Helmer, supra note 4, at 51.
188. Bennett, supra note 170.
189. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 103.
190. Id. Moreover, even though England operates under a common law system, discovery
methods in typical international commercial arbitrations held in that country resemble the civil
law tradition. See, e.g., Jeff Dasteel & Richard Jacobs, American Werewolves in London, 18
ARB. INT'L 165, 173-74, 176-78 (2002).
191. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 51.
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discovery methods to govern their dispute, that option is available, so
long as they can agree upon it.
2. Limited Examination of Witnesses
In the common law trial system, due to the presence of the jury,
oral presentation of evidence, examination of witnesses, and cross-
examination of witnesses are vital. 9 2  However, because most
international commercial arbitrations are rooted in civil law
traditions, arbitrators typically bestow more weight on documentary
evidence than on witness testimony. 9 3 As noted above, pre-hearing
depositions are quite rare.'94 Witness statements or affidavits are
submitted to the arbitral tribunal along with the parties' pre-hearing
written submissions, which outline their legal and factual positions in
detail.'95
International commercial arbitrations frequently hinge on issues
of contractual interpretation, for which written documents often are
the most reliable evidence.'96 Still, oral testimony and witness
credibility can be vital during the hearing phase.'97 Attorneys with
civil law backgrounds have come to recognize that examining
witnesses, especially through cross-examination, has many
benefits.'98 For example, "cross-examination can reveal a lying
witness, weakness in logic, or inaccuracy as to facts that may not
surface when the only means of challenging veracity is by an
affidavit or testimony from another witness.' 99  Even so,
examination of witnesses during the arbitration hearing is quite
different from that of a common law trial."' Direct examination is
usually limited to points which summarize written witness
192. Id. at 52.
193. See id. at 52-53.
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
195. BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 79.
196. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 101.
197. Id.
198. Helmer, supra note 4, at 53; see also Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 101 (stating that
cross-examination in international arbitration "provide[s] some opportunity for opposing counsel
to test the witness").
199. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 101.
200. See Helmer, supra note 4, at 53.
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statements. 21  Both counsel and the arbitrators may ask questions,
and typically counsel conducts examination (and cross-examination)
first, before the tribunal asks their own questions.0 2 Accordingly,
examination-in-chief and cross-examination are not separated into
two distinct phases. 23 Even though this differs greatly from common
law traditions, it nonetheless provides an opportunity for opposing
counsel to challenge witnesses in a less hostile atmosphere.2 4
In international commercial arbitration, the scope of cross-
examination is usually determined by the arbitrators, who, in their
discretion, can devise the means of testing witness accuracy or
credibility. 205  Unlike practices in American courts, where cross-
examination is normally limited to the scope of direct examination,0 6
cross-examination in international arbitration can cover all of the
issues presented by the witness in her written statement, whether or
not discussed during direct. 207 And, whereas testimony is recorded in
literal transcripts in common law proceedings, civil law influenced
international arbitration instead relies on testimonial summaries
prepared by the presiding arbitrator and presented to the witness for
approval and signature. 2" These condensed summaries, which can
be compared to similar processes followed in American
administrative law practice and bench trials, promote certainty and
common understanding in the witnesses' testimony by reconciling
inconsistencies and adding to the quality of the arbitrator's decision-
making.0 9
201. Id.; see also BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83 (noting that during the hearing,
witnesses just give a brief summary of their written statements before being questioned through
limited cross-examination and by the tribunal).
202. Helmer, supra note 4, at 53. Contra BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83.
203. Helmer, supra note 4, at 53.
204. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 101.
205. Id. at 102. By limiting the conduct of cross-examination, the tribunal will ensure that
counsel with civil law backgrounds will not be placed at a disadvantage. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 83.
206. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(b) ("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination.").
207. Helmer, supra note 4, at 53.
208. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83.
209. Rau & Sherman, supra note 15, at 98; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Two-Way
Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
163, 169 (1985) ("[W]hereas the witnesses had stammered or mumbled, occasionally contradicted
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3. Multi-Party Disputes:
Issues with Joinder and Consolidation
Complex international business transactions often involve both
multiple contracts and multiple parties. When multi-party lawsuits
arise, most legal systems have developed an assortment of procedural
devices that authorize national courts to permit the joinder of parties
in a judicial proceeding2 or the consolidation of separate claims
between different parties into a single proceeding.2 ' Such a
framework does not exist in international arbitration, however, and it
is rare for the parties' arbitration agreement(s) to specifically
contemplate multi-party arbitration and include provisions dealing
with consolidation and joinder."2
Should parties in an international commercial arbitration agree
to joinder of additional parties or to consolidation of separate
claims,2"3 international arbitral tribunals and appointing authorities
will allow it.214 Conversely, when there is disagreement among the
parties as to joinder or consolidation, institutional rules generally do
not permit it.2" 5 However, even when multi-party arbitration is
and then corrected themselves, omitted relevant facts and then come back to them under prodding
from counsel or questioning from the panel, the arbitrator produced a neat, logical, perfectly
grammatical, and even elegant statement of the position of each witness or party.").
210. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13-14, 19-21, 24. For purposes of this article, third-party
intervention is treated as a subspecies ofjoinder.
211. See, e.g., id. 42(a).
212. BORN, supra note 46, at 673; see also Irene M. Ten Cate, Multi-Party and Multi-
Contract Arbitrations: Procedural Mechanisms and Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements
Under U.S. Law, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, 135-36 (2004) (noting that "it has been suggested
that litigation in national court-systems may be better suited than arbitration to deal with disputes
involving multiple parties or contracts," which is "unfortunate, because a substantial proportion
of disputes submitted to arbitration involve more than one contract or more than two parties").
213. Consolidated arbitration occurs when "[t]wo or more separately commenced arbitrations
are consolidated and thereafter proceed before a single tribunal as an unified multi-party
arbitration." BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 102 n.320.
214. BORN, supra note 46, at 673.
215. Id. The LCIA Rules do allow for third-party joinder, under limited circumstances:
Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall
have the power, on the application of any party or of its own motion, but in either case
only after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their views: ...
(h) to allow, only upon the application of a party, one or more third persons to be
joined in the arbitration as a party provided any such third person and the applicant
party have consented thereto in writing, and thereafter to make a single final award, or
separate awards, in respect of all parties so implicated in the arbitration ....
LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES arts. 22.1, 22.1(h) (1998) (emphasis
added).
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administered, a potential risk can arise-adding parties to a
proceeding can interfere with the original parties' agreement
regarding the selection procedure for the arbitral tribunal.' 6  To
mitigate this risk, some institutions address the composition of the
tribunal in multi-party arbitrations. For example, Article 10 of the
ICC Rules obliges "the multiple Claimants, jointly, and the multiple
Respondents, jointly [to] nominate an arbitrator for confirmation."2 7
When the parties cannot agree on a joint nomination or a different
method for selecting the tribunal, the ICC Court will appoint the
panel." 8 Even so, it has been suggested that because a consolidated
proceeding modifies the procedure by which the arbitral tribunal is
appointed, it may be impossible to enforce resulting awards under
the New York Convention.2"9 Thus, "parties requesting joinder or
consolidation and tribunals granting such orders should be aware of
the risks that this course of conduct may present when enforcement
of the resulting award is sought.""22 This risk is greatest when there
is a lack of legislative authorization under the procedural law of the
arbitral situs, and when the order is based on an arbitration
agreement that does not clearly permit joinder or consolidation. 2 '
In the absence of clear agreement or applicable institutional
rules, decisions on consolidation and joinder in international
commercial arbitration are left to both arbitral tribunals and national
courts, as most countries' national arbitration statutes are silent on
the topic.2 2 In the United States, the Supreme Court has taken the
position that arbitral tribunals, rather than courts, should make these
procedural determinations.2  In other countries, such as the
216. Ten Cate, supra note 212, at 143.
217. ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 10(1) (1998).
218. Id. art. 10(2).
219. Ten Cate, supra note 212, at 145. "Article V(1)(d) of the [New York] Convention
allows for refusal of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards where '[t]he composition of
the arbitral authority, or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties .... ' Id. (quoting New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(d), 21 U.S.T. at 2520,
330 U.N.T.S. at 42); see infra Part D.1.
220. Ten Cate, supra note 212, at 146.
221. Id. at 146. Some commentators have suggested that if consolidation is based on the
parties' implied consent, then Article V(1)(d) would likely not be offended. BORN, supra note
46, at 695.
222. See BORN, supra note 46, at 695.
223. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (holding that
"'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition" are
presumed to be for the arbitrator, rather than the judge, to decide (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Netherlands, courts retain the power to order consolidation of
separate arbitrations.224 Arbitral tribunals that are faced with the
decision of whether to order consolidation or joinder under these
circumstances will have to use contract interpretation tools to
determine whether it is "'more likely than not[] that the parties
intended consolidation."'225  Ultimately, to avoid some of these
issues, parties entering into complex international business
transactions with multiple partners should consider including clear
and detailed consolidation and joinder provisions in their arbitration
agreements.226
D. Post-Award Annulment and Enforcement
Issues in International Arbitration
"[T]he ultimate test of any arbitration proceeding is its ability to
render an award which, if necessary, will be recognized and enforced
in relevant national courts." '227 The majority of international arbitral
awards do not require either judicial confirmation or enforcement, as
losing parties tend to comply with the terms of awards against them
or settle soon after the award is rendered.228 However, when the
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964))). While not technically binding precedent, the Supreme
Court's plurality opinion Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle expresses a similar viewpoint:
[T]he relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed
to[, and this] concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedures. Arbitrators
are well situated to answer that question. Given these considerations ... this matter of
contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.
539 U.S. 444,452-53 (2003).
224. See Netherlands Arbitration Act art. 1046 (1986), reprinted in BORN, supra note 46, at
680-81 (allowing "any of the parties" to request the court to order consolidation of separate
arbitrations "unless the parties have agreed otherwise").
225. Ten Cate, supra note 212, at 154 (quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2000)). The arbitral tribunal should make this
factual determination on a case-by-case basis, and in doing so, should consider several factors,
including the language of the arbitration provisions, the purpose of the agreements and
considerations of efficiency, and the consequences of consolidated proceedings for the
constitution of the tribunal. Id.
226. Of course, parties may not prefer consolidation or joinder in many circumstances, given
its potential to increase the length and cost of the arbitration. See Rau & Sherman, supra note 15,
at 109. Parties who are wary of multi-party international arbitration can include provisions in
their arbitration agreements strictly forbidding joinder or consolidation.
227. BORN, supra note 46, at 704.
228. Noah Rubins, The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in
Indonesia, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 359, 359-60 (2005) [hereinafter Rubins, Indonesia]. See
generally Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-Award Experience in International
Commercial Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 269-75 (presenting a study
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losing party in an international arbitration believes the award has
been made in error, they may commence proceedings in the national
courts of the arbitral situs to vacate or annul the award.229
While the New York Convention prescribes standards for the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, it does
not address the grounds on which a court in the arbitral situs may
vacate or annul an award. 23" The legal principles for vacating
international arbitration awards are expressed in the national laws of
the territory where the award is made. 231 As national arbitration laws
set forth varying grounds on which arbitration awards can be
annulled, attorneys need to be familiar with different approaches
across the globe. Thus, this section explores several national
standards for annulment proceedings.
Furthermore, the enforcement mechanisms of the New York
Convention have been implemented by contracting states through
national legislation. While the goal of the New York Convention
drafters was global uniformity in enforcement of awards, not all the
parties to the Convention have interpreted it in an identical fashion.232
Thus, this section also addresses some of the issues that arise when
the winning party institutes enforcement proceedings under the New
York Convention.233
1. The Scope of the New York Convention
The New York Convention requires the courts of contracting
states to recognize and enforce arbitral awards entered in another
state, as well as those awards that a contracting state considers "non-
of post-award experience based on responses from parties to international commercial arbitrations
conducted through the ICDR/AAA).
229. See BORN, supra note 46, at 704.
230. Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An
Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 455 (2000) [hereinafter Drahozal, An
Economic Approach].
231. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42
(permitting awards to be vacated by courts of the nation "under the law of which [the] award was
made"); Drahozal, An Economic Approach, supra note 230, at 455.
232. See BORN, supra note 46, at 796 (noting that "some national arbitration statutes permit
more expansive judicial review in [enforcement] actions" and others authorize local courts to
review de novo both the substantive and procedural aspects of the arbitrators' decisions).
233. The Panama Convention does not have the same global reach of the New York
Convention and many of the contracting parties to the New York Convention are also parties to
the Panama Convention. Thus, this article focuses solely on enforcement issues under the New
York Convention.
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domestic" awards. 34 In addition, Article III of the New York
Convention instructs contracting states to enforce foreign arbitral
awards according to the rules of procedure in the territory in which
the award is sought to be enforced.2 35  Article III also prohibits a
contracting state from imposing substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees than are imposed on domestic awards. 36
Thus, an arbitral award subject to the New York Convention may be
presumptively valid.
To obtain the recognition and enforcement of an award, the
winning party must supply the following two documents to the
national court where enforcement is sought: (a) the authenticated
original award or a certified copy, and (b) the original arbitration
agreement or a certified copy, which must be "signed by the parties
or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. '"237 Upon
providing these documents, the burden shifts to the party resisting
enforcement to prove one of the several defenses to the validity of an
award.238
Subsection 1 of Article V of the New York Convention allows
national courts to refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award
only if the losing party can prove one of the following defenses: (a)
the arbitration agreement is invalid;239 (b) the party was denied
procedural fairness or due process in the arbitral proceedings; 24 ° (c)
234. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487 cmt. g
(1987) (noting several situations where awards are subject to the New York Convention). Non-
domestic awards subject to the Convention are discussed infra.
235. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
236. Id.
237. Id. arts. II, IV, 21 U.S.T. at 2519-20, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38, 40.
238. E.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) ("While the Geneva Convention placed the burden
of proof on the party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and did not circumscribe the
range of available defenses to those enumerated in the Convention, the 1958 Convention clearly
shifted the burden of proof to the party defending against enforcement and limited his defenses to
seven set forth in Article V.").
239. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40
("The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them,
under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made.").
240. Id. art. V(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42 ("The party against whom the
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case."); BORN, supra note 46, at
832-33.
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the arbitrators exceeded their authority;24 1 (d) the arbitral procedures
deviated materially from the parties' agreement or the applicable
procedural law;242 or (e) the award is not yet binding or "has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made." '243 In addition,
even if not raised by the party opposing enforcement, subsection 2 of
Article V permits national courts to refuse to recognize or enforce
awards subject to the New York Convention if they find: (a) the
subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under
the law of that country;244 or (b) "[t]he recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country. "245
The first four grounds contained in Article V(1)(a)-(d) and the
grounds set forth in Article V(2)(a) do not involve questions of error
in applying the substantive law and facts associated with the merits
of a party's claims. 246  Thus, these five grounds do not provide the
party resisting enforcement with any means to obtain relief from
substantive errors made by the arbitrators.2 47  The two additional
Article V defenses provide only narrow means for a party aggrieved
by substantive errors may avoid enforcement of the award. 48
2. Annulment of Arbitral Awards
Under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, a national
court may refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that "has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
241. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42
("The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.").
242. Id. art. V(l)(d), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42 ("The composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place."); BORN, supra note 46, at 833-34.
243. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
244. Id. art. V(2)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
245. Id. art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
246. James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a
Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 66 (2004).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 249
Courts and commentators have interpreted the language of this
provision to mean that the only place the parties may file a motion to
set aside or vacate an award is in the country whose domestic law
applied to the arbitration proceedings.25° In other words, the place of
arbitration is given exclusive or "primary" jurisdiction to annul
arbitral awards.251 The result is that the standards for vacating an
award are determined by the arbitral procedural law that governed
the arbitration rather than the applicable substantive law.252 In
reality, the procedural law governing the arbitration is almost always
the law of the situs of the arbitration. 3 While the contracting parties
are free to agree to a procedural law other than that of the situs, this
practice is very rare.254
Accordingly, under the New York Convention, the procedural
law of the location for arbitration specified in an arbitration
agreement is presumed to apply to the arbitration. 5 While the
249. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
250. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that the country with primary jurisdiction over an arbi-
tration award is the country where the award was made or the country under whose arbitration
laws the award was made (citing Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003))); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L.
v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.,
1996 FED App. 0195P at 5-6 (6th Cir.); Empresa Colombiana de Vias Frrreas (Ferrovias) v.
Drummond Ltd., 29 Y.B. COM. ARB. (Int'l Council for Com. Arb.) 643, 653-54 (2004); S. A.
Mines, Minrais et M~taux v. Mechema Ltd., 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. (Int'l Council for Com. Arb.)
316, 317 (1982); Jan Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial
Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 242 (1981) ("[T]he fact is that setting aside awards under the
New York Convention can take place only in the country in which the award was made.");
Rubins, Indonesia, supra note 228, at 389 ("[T]he only courts that are competent to hear a motion
to vacate a foreign arbitral award are those in the country in which the arbitration took place, or
the courts of any country whose procedural law is specifically invoked in the contract.").
25 1. Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 287 (citing Karaha Bodas,335 F.3d at 364).
252. Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial,
745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
253. Gaitis, supra note 246, at 54.
254. Id.; see also Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 291 ("Authorities on international arbitration
describe an agreement providing that one country will be the site of the arbitration but the
proceedings will be held under the arbitration law of another country by terms such as
,exceptional'; 'almost unknown'; a 'purely academic invention'; 'almost never used in practice';
a possibility 'more theoretical than real'; and a 'once-in-a-blue-moon set of circumstances."')
(footnotes omitted).
255. Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 291. Likewise, the place of arbitration can be seen as
independent of the place of hearings. Webster, supra note 95, at 211. In Karaha Bodas, "[t]he
arbitration proceeding.., physically occurred in Paris, but the Award was 'made in' Geneva, the
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language of Article V(1)(e) suggests the possibility that more than
one country may be eligible for primary jurisdiction, the predominant
view is that the Convention permits only one in any given case.256
Ultimately, under the New York Convention, the power and
authority of the national courts in the rendering state have vital
importance.257 Countries may devise whatever rules they wish
regarding the grounds on which their courts can invalidate an award
rendered in their territory.258
a. Annulment of arbitral awards in the United States
Under the standards discussed above, the United States has
primary jurisdiction to annul arbitral awards that are rendered in its
territory. Thus, for purely domestic arbitrations, annulment
standards are governed by section 10 of chapter 1 of the FAA, which
provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitral award.2 59 However,
do the same annulment standards apply when an arbitration
involving foreign parties results in an award rendered in the United
States? What about when two American parties arbitrate a dispute in
the United States over a contract that envisions performance abroad?
Even though more than 35 years have passed since the United States
ratified the New York Convention, the answers to such questions
remains somewhat unclear.
place of the arbitration in the legal sense and the presumptive source of the applicable procedural
law." 364 F.3d at 292.
256. Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 308.
257. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2d Cir.
1997); see W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1995) ("What the Convention
did not do ... was provide any international mechanism to insure the validity of the award where
rendered. This was left to the provisions of local law. The Convention provides no restraint
whatsoever on the control functions of local courts at the seat of arbitration.").
258. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), supra note 57, at 24.
259. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) sets forth four grounds for vacating an arbitration award rendered in the
United States:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. 2006).
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The New York Convention applies to "arbitral awards not
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition
and enforcement are sought,'2 6 yet fails to define what such "non-
domestic" awards are.261 Courts in the United States have maintained
that section 202 of the FAA provides the definition of a "non-
domestic" award under the Convention.262  Accordingly, "any
commercial arbitral agreement, unless it is between two United
States citizens, involves property located in the United States, and
has no reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states, falls
under the Convention.
2 63
Notwithstanding the general recognition of this broad definition
of "non-domestic" awards under the New York Convention's
implementing legislation, standards for the annulment of awards
remain inconsistent because few federal courts have addressed the
issue. Relying on the notion that Article V(1)(e) of the Convention
permits courts to apply domestic arbitral law to a motion to vacate a
"non-domestic" arbitral award entered into in the United States,
some courts have held that the grounds set forth in section 10 of the
FAA apply to vacate these "non-domestic" awards. 6 In contrast,
other courts have come to the opposite conclusion. Instead of
260. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
261. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). One commentator
notes that "[t]he question what constitutes a nondomestic award within the meaning of the New
York Convention is one of the most complicated issues posed by this Treaty." Albert Jan van den
Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 1958?, 6
PACE L. REV. 25, 26 (1985).
262. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933; see also Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc.,
2005 FED App. 0137P at 6 (6th Cir.); Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 18-19; Ministry of Defense
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1989). Section 202
provides, in relevant part:
An [arbitration] agreement or award arising out of [a commercial] relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states.
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
263. Jain v. de M&6, 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Indus. Risk
Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshfitte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (holding
that an arbitral award made in the United States and under U.S. law is "non-domestic" under
section 202 "when one of the parties to the arbitration is domiciled or has its principal place of
business outside of the United States").
264. Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 21, 23; see also Jacada, 401 F.3d at 709-12; Lander Co.
v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Convention "contemplates
the possibility of the award's being set aside in a proceeding under local law").
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applying section 10's grounds to a motion to vacate a "non-
domestic" award, these courts have held that the proper vacatur
standards for such an award are actually the seven Article V defenses
against recognition and enforcement.265
While there are minor differences in the language of section 10
and Article V, a comparison of the standards reveals that they are
"broadly similar (but not identical). 266  Ultimately, holding that
section 10 of the FAA applies to vacatur proceedings of "non-
domestic" awards is the more sensible approach.6 7 It conforms to
the general supposition that an action to set aside an international
arbitral award is controlled by the domestic law of the rendering
state. In addition, it "corresponds to the will of the parties, who
choose the arbitral seat not only for commodity and neutrality
purposes but also, and perhaps especially today, for applicable
provisions on the challenge of awards. '268 However, confusion may
result when the losing party attempts to vacate the award at the same
time that the winning party attempts to enforce it, as not entirely
consistent statutory regimes would govern the validity of the same
award.269 While such an occurrence may be rare and involves limited
risks, the differences could be critical in certain instances.27 °
i. Manifest disregard of the law
Courts holding that the annulment grounds set forth in the
domestic FAA govern motions to vacate "non-domestic" awards
rendered in the United States may also consider various substantive
common law grounds for annulment.7 ' Of these various non-
265. E.g., Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1441-42, 1446.
266. BORN, supra note 46, at 782; see also van den Berg, supra note 261, at 55 ("Many of
these grounds for refusal of enforcement correspond in essence to the grounds for setting aside
under [9 U.S.C. § 10].").
267. See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 213, 239-40 (1996).
268. HAMID G. GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANNULMENT OF AN
ARBITRAL AWARD 16 (2002).
269. BORN, supra note 46, at 726-27.
270. Id. at 727. For example, a court holding that section 10 of the FAA applies to actions to
vacate "non-domestic" awards could look to substantive, non-statutory grounds in rendering an
annulment. See infra Part D.2.a.i. In an enforcement action brought by the winning party,
however, the losing party would not be able to bring any of these non-statutory defenses. See
infra Part D.3.
271. Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the
United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 365 (2001) [hereinafter Rubins, Manifest
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statutory grounds, the most widely recognized basis is "manifest
disregard of the law" by the arbitrator(s).2 72  This standard was
introduced by the Supreme Court as dicta in Wilko v. Swan,273 and
since has been adopted, in slightly varying definitions, by all of the
federal circuit courts.274 The most common formulation of the
doctrine is that it requires the record to show that the arbitrator(s)
knew the law yet explicitly disregarded it, which requires more than
a showing of error or a misunderstanding about the law.275
Some commentators believe that applying the manifest disregard
standard to the vacatur of "non-domestic" arbitral awards could have
a chilling effect on the integrity of international commercial
arbitration in the United States.2 76  However, use of the manifest
disregard standard is severely limited and requires an extremely
strong showing on behalf of the losing party. 77 Nevertheless,
commentators have suggested that Congress should consider revising
the FAA to draw a clearer distinction between domestic and
international arbitral awards and to harmonize the grounds for
annulment of "non-domestic" awards with the enforcement defenses
in Article V of the New York Convention.278 Indeed, doing so would
Disregard]. These non-statutory grounds include manifest disregard of the law, conflict with
public policy, an arbitrary and capricious award, complete irrationality of the award, and the
award's failure to draw its essence from the underlying contract. Id. at 365 n.12 (citing Gabriel
M. Wilner, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 34:07 (1984)).
272. Id. at 366; e.g., YusufAhmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d
15, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1997).
273. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
274. See Rubins, Manifest Disregard, supra note 271, at 366, 368-70 (describing circuit court
cases that have enunciated the "manifest disregard" formulation).
275. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
276. See William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1253-54 (2003) [hereinafter Park, The Case for FAA
Reform]; Rubins, Manifest Disregard, supra note 271, at 371-72.
277. For example, the Second Circuit has stated:
Our reluctance over the years to find manifest disregard is a reflection of the fact that it
is a doctrine of last resort-its use is limited only to those exceedingly rare instances
where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent, but where
none of the provisions of the FAA apply. It should be remembered that arbitrators are
hired by parties to reach a result that conforms to industry norms and to the arbitrator's
[sic] notions of fairness. To interfere with this process would frustrate the intent of the
parties, and thwart the usefulness of arbitration ....
Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
278. See, e.g., Park, The Case for FAA Reform, supra note 276, at 1248-49; Rubins, Manifest
Disregard, supra note 271, at 372.
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promote certainty and consistency in the standards for annulment of
"non-domestic" arbitral awards.
ii. Contracting for heightened judicial review
One oft-cited benefit of arbitration is finality.279 When an award
is rendered, the losing party who believes the award is in error must
resort to judicial annulment proceedings. Not only does an
international system for appellate review of arbitral awards not
exist,28° but the rules of many arbitration institutions provide that the
arbitration award shall be final and binding upon the parties.28' In
recent years, parties have become increasingly concerned with
arbitration's limited scope of review.282  Because many parties are
wary of unpredictable or potentially biased decision-making on the
part of arbitrators, some parties have begun to include clauses in their
arbitration agreements that attempt to expand the scope of judicial
279. Kristen M. Blankley, Be More Specific! Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration Agreement
Expand Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 391,
392 (2006). Many parties arbitrate to avoid the lengthy appellate process and other delays that
can arise in litigation. Id.
280. Many commentators have disputed the notion that arbitration provides for finality and
have called for the creation of a viable international arbitration appeals system. See, e.g., Howard
M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving
Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE 109, 111-12 (Martin
Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V. Veeder eds., 1995); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Creation and
Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE, supra, at 115, 115;
Gaitis, supra note 246, at 97-102; William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on
International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531,
550-63 (2000). Under the system proposed by Holtzman and Schwebel, the "court would have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether recognition and enforcement of international arbitral
awards may be refused for the reasons set forth in Art[icle] V of the New York Convention."
Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9.
281. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS'N INT'L ARB. RULES art. 27(1) (Am. Arb. Ass'n 2006)
("Awards shall be made in writing, promptly by the tribunal, and shall be final and binding on the
parties."); ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 28(6) (1998) ("Every Award shall be binding on the parties.
By submitting the dispute to arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any
Award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse
insofar as such waiver can validly be made."); LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. RULES art. 26.9
(1998) ("All awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By agreeing to arbitration under
these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any delay ...
and . . . also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state
court or other judicial authority, insofar as such waiver may be validly made.").
282. Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review ofArbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 171, 172 (2003).
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review.283 Most of these clauses call for vacatur of awards for errors
of law, errors of fact, or both.
2 84
In the United States, the legal status of clauses expanding the
scope of judicial review is uncertain. The Supreme Court has not
taken up the issue, despite a split among circuit courts that have
addressed it.285 The circuits that have allowed parties to contract for
heightened judicial review of arbitral awards have done so primarily
on the rationale that arbitration provides parties with freedom of
contract. 86 In contrast, the circuits that have rejected heightened
judicial review of arbitral awards have done so by noting that such
review would "interfere with the judicial process ' '287 and that "private
parties lack the power to dictate a broad standard of review when
Congress has specifically prescribed a narrower standard [in the
FAA]. 288  Furthermore, state courts have routinely rejected
contractually expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.289
283. Id. at 173.
284. Knull & Rubins, supra note 280, at 545. An arbitration agreement may attempt to order
a district court to vacate an award which is not supported by "substantial evidence" or which
contains erroneous "conclusions of law." Blankley, supra note 279, at 394.
285. Compare P.R. Tele. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005),
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001), and Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (all supporting
heightened judicial review by contract), with Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998-1000 (9th Cir. 2003), and Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,
934-37 (10th Cir. 2001) (both holding that parties cannot contract for standards of review greater
than those provided in the FAA). Although these cases dealt with domestic arbitrations, the same
issues could of course arise in international arbitration. Cf Robert Donald Fischer & Roger S.
Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable Arbitration Agreement, 21
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 941, 973 (1996). The Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to resolve
this circuit split in Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App'x 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, 127 S.Ct. 2875 (2007), and will hear arguments on November 7, 2007. See Supreme
Court Docket, Case No. 06-989, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-989.htm.
286. E.g., Gateway Techs., 64 F.3d at 996-97.
287. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934. The Bowen court also noted that contracting for expanded
judicial review was contrary to the purposes of the FAA. Id. at 935.
288. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 1000.
289. See, e.g., John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 703-04
(N.D. 2003); Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363,
370-71 (Ct. App. 2002); Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 817
(Ct. App. 2002); Chi. Southshore and S. Bend R.R. v. N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 682
N.E.2d 156, 159 (I11. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (Ill. 1998); Dick v.
Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); cf Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs.,
Inc., No. GD04-015418, 2005 WL 1595280, at *34-36 (Pa. D. & C.4th Mar. 2, 2005). But see
Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Ct. App.
2003).
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Commentators also have disagreed as to which standard is
appropriate.290 On balance, however, the better reasoned approach is
to reject contractually expanded judicial review. Although
arbitration's contractual nature gives parties great freedom to
customize its processes, it should not allow them to dictate how
courts do their jobs. 9' There is nothing in the Constitution or in
Supreme Court precedent that suggests such a relationship between
the parties and the courts.292 As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "[e]ven
when Congress is silent on the matter, private parties lack the power
to dictate how the federal courts conduct the business of resolving
disputes. "293 Despite the freedom of contract available in arbitration,
such freedom should not disrupt the independence of the judiciary.
Instead, parties who seek expanded review of awards should consider
contracting for an appellate arbitration panel to review the
arbitrator's award. 94
b. Annulment standards in foreign countries
Outside of the United States, the national laws of many
countries retain the principle that courts at the place of arbitration
have primary jurisdiction to annul arbitral awards.295 In fact, this
notion has been adopted by most States, including England, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Lebanon, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, Spain, and Ukraine.296
However, some States have broken from the norm and have
developed annulment standards that flout the well-respected
principle of primary jurisdiction. For example, several States,
290. Goldman, supra note 282, at 173 & n.15 (citing articles in favor of, and against,
heightened judicial review). In contrast to these binary approaches, Goldman argues that
heightened judicial review "should be enforced in large, individually negotiated contracts
between commercial entities, but rejected in standard form contracts for small consumer goods
between parties of unequal bargaining power." Id. at 179-80.
291. Blankley, supra note 279, at 425.
292. Id.
293. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 1000; see also Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 263 n.4 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("However, the court, not the parties, must determine the standard of review ....");
United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "no party has the
power to control our standard of review"); Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Parties] cannot contract for judicial review of [an
arbitrall award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.").
294. Chi. Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505.
295. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 12.
296. Id. at 12-15.
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through court decisions or positive law, have adopted an "extra-
territorial jurisdictional rule" whereby national courts can exercise
jurisdiction over the annulment of arbitral awards rendered outside of
their territory.297 By giving their national courts such jurisdictional
discretion, these countries, including Pakistan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia,
and Indonesia, have the potential to create a legally unstable climate
and insecurity in international business.298 In addition, some States
retain the power to actually deprive their courts of jurisdiction over
the vacatur of awards rendered within their territory. 299 For instance,
in Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, and Tunisia, parties in certain
disputes can waive their right to annul arbitral awards rendered in the
territory."' Some commentators speculate that these "opt-out"
regulations may have been enacted in order to compete for
international arbitration business."' Nevertheless, such waivers are
hardly ever exercised in practice.3 2
The legal framework of countries that allow for "extra-territorial
jurisdiction" over arbitral awards or the exclusion of jurisdiction over
awards rendered in the State's territory is troublesome. Not only
does such a framework increase the risk of doing business
internationally, but it can enable national courts "to hold-through
doubtful reasoning-that they have jurisdiction over the annulment
of an award rendered abroad that is unfavorable to their nationals.""3 3
In fashioning standards for the annulment of arbitral awards in
their national arbitration laws, many countries have taken inspiration
from the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration ("UNCITRAL Model Law"),3  which was "designed to
assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral
procedure so as to take into account the particular features and needs
297. Id. at 17.
298. Id. at 18-22.
299. Id. at 23.
300. Id. at 23-24. Usually, these arbitrations must involve parties who are neither domiciled
nor reside in the State's territory. See id. Malaysia takes a more draconian approach, excluding
from the scope of its laws the application of any arbitration held under the UNCITRAL Rules and
the Rules of the Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala Lumpur. Id. at 27-28.
301. See, e.g., Drahozal, An Economic Approach, supra note 230, at 458.
302. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 24.
303. Id. at 29 (foomote omitted).
304. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB. (1985), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-5467 1_Ebook.pdf.
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of international commercial arbitration. ' 30 5  Article 34 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, entitled "Application for Setting Aside as
Exclusive Recourse Against Arbitral Award," contains exhaustive
annulment grounds." 6 These track the list of grounds for non-
enforcement of awards contained in Article V of the New York
Convention.3 7 Approximately fifty countries have adopted the
Model Law as part of their national arbitration legislation. 8
However, only a third of these countries whose arbitration laws have
been inspired by the Model Law have faithfully adopted Article 34's
annulment grounds. 3 9  Some countries, including England and
Australia, actually provide for a significant opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the substantive reasoning of a non-domestic
award. 310  Furthermore, national laws in such countries as Brazil,
England, China, South Africa, and Egypt contain additional grounds
on which awards can be vacated.31' On the other hand, laws in such
countries as France, Belgium, and Sweden contain less rigorous
annulment grounds than that of the Model Law.312 These divergent
approaches limit uniformity and reduce certainty in international
commercial arbitration. While international business might benefit
from a new convention that would cover global annulment standards
and complement the New York Convention, 13 it remains uncertain
whether there is enough support for such an endeavor.
305. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.uncitral
.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2007).
306. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB. art. 34; GHARAVI, supra note
268, at 30-31.
307. See supra Part D. 1.
308. See Status, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1 985Modelarbitrationstatus.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2007).
309. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 32-33. The counties that have faithfully adopted Article
34's provisions include Bahrain, Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, Germany,
Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Russia, Scotland, and Ukraine. Id.
310. Id. at 33-35; see also Gaitis, supra note 246, at 62.
311. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 36-39.
312. Id. at41-42.
313. See U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), supra note 57, at 45.
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3. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the United States
Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the New York Convention in
U.S. courts? 14  The implementing legislation was enacted to
encourage arbitration of disputes arising out of transactions by
American business in foreign countries 315 and to unify standards by
which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced.316 Section 203 of the FAA grants U.S. district courts
subject matter jurisdiction in any action "falling under the
Convention '31 7 and section 205 provides for removal to federal court
where the "subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a
State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under
the Convention. ' 318 In addition, for venue purposes, section 204
provides that an action to enforce an award falling under the
Convention can be brought in any U.S. district court where the
parties' dispute could originally have been litigated or where the
parties agreed that arbitration could occur.1 9 Section 204 appears to
strip venue from enforcement actions for arbitrations conducted
abroad where the underlying dispute would not have been subject to
U.S. jurisdiction.32" However, the general rule that FAA venue
provisions are to be interpreted as permissive, not mandatory,32'
permits reliance in enforcement actions on other venue statutes, such
as the Alien Venue Act, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)-(c), the general venue statute.322
Section 207 of the FAA governs the enforcement and
recognition in U.S. courts of arbitral awards which satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the New York Convention. This
section provides:
314. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000).
315. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973).
316. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
317. 9 U.S.C. § 203; see also Brooke L. Myers, Developments, Treaties and Federal
Question Jurisdiction: Enforcing Treaty-Based Rights in Federal Court, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1449, 1500-02 (2007).
318. 9 U.S.C. § 205.
319. Id. § 204.
320. BORN, supra note 46, at 884.
321. See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 203-04 (2000).
322. BORN, supra note 46, at 884 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391).
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Within three years after an arbitral award falling under
the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may
apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for
an order confirming the award as against any other party to
the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of
recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the
said Convention.23
Thus, section 207 imposes an obligation to enforce arbitral awards,
subject to the limited defenses set forth in Article V of the New York
Convention, and forbids application of any other, non-Convention
bases for non-enforcement. 24 In addition, under Article VI of the
New York Convention, U.S. courts can refuse to enforce a
Convention award when it is simultaneously subject to annulment
proceedings.325
a. Potential procedural issues with
enforcement in U.S. courts
i. Personal jurisdiction
Courts in the United States have generally been highly receptive
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York
Convention.3 26 The grounds set forth in Article V of the Convention
have been held to be exclusive defenses to enforcement.3 27 Despite
this fact, recent court decisions have declined to enforce awards
323. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added).
324. BORN, supra note 46, at 882; see also Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,
465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1978).
325. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42 ("If
an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent
authority referred to in article V(I)(e), the authority before which the award is sought to be relied
upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may
also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to
give suitable security.").
326. Int'l Commercial Disputes Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Lack of
Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens as Defenses to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 407, 407 (2004) [hereinafter Defenses to Enforcement].
327. YusufAhmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19-20 (2d
Cir. 1997).
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based on lack of personal jurisdiction.32 Courts that have addressed
the issue have held that in order for an arbitral award to be enforced,
the Due Process Clause3" requires the enforcing court to have either
personal jurisdiction over the award debtor or quasi in rem
jurisdiction over his property. 30 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
expressed differing views over the showing required to establish
quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the award debtor's property. In
Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum
Factory, " the Fourth Circuit held that "when the property which
serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
plaintiffs cause of action, the presence of property alone will not
support jurisdiction."33' Conversely, in Glencore Grain Rotterdam
B. V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., the Ninth Circuit stated, albeit
in dictum, that quasi in rem jurisdiction is proper over an award
debtor's property in the forum, regardless of whether the property is
related to the controversy.332
The Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that "(1) neither the
Convention nor its implementing legislation expressly requires
personal jurisdiction ... and (2) lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in the state where enforcement is sought is not among the
Convention's seven defenses to recognition and enforcement of a
foreign arbitration award." '333 Nevertheless, the Convention did not
abrogate the Due Process requirement that the court obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant or quasi in rem jurisdiction over his
property.334 At first blush, it would seem that the Fourth Circuit's
approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction in the enforcement of a foreign
328. E.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114,
1128 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,"
283 F.3d 208, 211 (4th Cir. 2002).
329. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
330. See, e.g., Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1122; Base Metal Trading, 283 F.3d at 212-13;
Italtrade Int'l USA, L.L.C. v. Sri Lanka Cement Corp., No. CIV.A.00-2458, 2002 WL 59399, at
*2 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2002); Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd., v. Saudi Chartering S.A., 622 F.
Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
331. 283 F.3d at 213.
332. 284 F.3d at 1127.
333. Id. at 1121.
334. Id. at 1121-22; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 487 cmt. c (1987) ("An arbitral award is ordinarily enforced by confirmation in
a judgment .... As in respect to judgments .. .an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award
requires jurisdiction over the award debtor or his property.").
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arbitral award conforms more closely to the Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.335 In Shaffer, the Supreme
Court extended the Due Process requirement that a "defendant...
have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice' ' 336 to in rem and quasi in rem actions.337
Relying on Shaffer, the Fourth Circuit declined to exercise quasi in
rem jurisdiction in an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award
where property in the forum did not satisfy the minimum contacts
standards. 338  This holding conforms to the requirement of a
connection between the award debtor, or his property, and the place
of enforcement in actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards in many
other countries, including China, Japan, England, and Switzerland.339
Nonetheless, while a goal of the New York Convention is global
uniformity in enforcing awards, the Fourth Circuit overlooked a
crucial distinction noted by the Supreme Court between actions on
the merits and enforcement proceedings in the United States. In a
footnote, the Shaffer Court indicated that there may be an exception
to the minimum contacts requirement in enforcement actions:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff,
there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action
to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has
property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction
to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter.34 °
Though this footnote touched on the enforcement of sister state
judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution,
there is a valid argument that this rationale should apply with equal
force to arbitral awards and judgments rendered in foreign
335. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
336. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
337. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
338. Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory," 283 F.3d 208,
215 (4th Cir. 2002).
339. Defenses to Enforcement, supra note 326, at 413-15.
340. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36.
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countries.34' Until the issue is flushed out by other courts, however,
there appears to be a split in authority.342
ii. Forum non conveniens
Unlike jurisdiction, a convenient forum is not a requirement
under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.343 Nevertheless, in
Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine,34 4
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action
to confirm and enforce a foreign arbitral award on the grounds of
forum non conveniens.345 In this case, the claimant filed a petition in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York seeking enforcement of a multi-million dollar arbitration award
rendered in Moscow.346  In the petition, claimant also sought
confirmation and judgment against the State of Ukraine, contending
that the country was liable as an "alter ego" of the pipeline company
respondent.347 Rejecting the claimant's contention that forum non
conveniens did not apply because it was not among the exclusive
defenses enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention,348 the
Second Circuit relied on Article III of the Convention, which
requires contracting states to "recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
341. Defenses to Enforcement, supra note 326, at 418.
342. In Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, a case dealing with the same quasi in rem
jurisdiction issues raised in Glencore Grain and Base Metal Trading, the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to consider "whether a party seeking to enforce a foreign
arbitral award under the [New York] Convention must establish a basis for exercising personal
jurisdiction over the other party, or the property of that party, against whom enforcement is
sought;" and whether "the presence of property alone can supply the jurisdictional basis in an
action to enforce arbitral awards under the Convention or under state law." 317 F.3d 202, 206,
208 (2d Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted). Some commentators have suggested that this remand was
a tacit acceptance that the presence of the debtor's property, without anything more, could be
sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the debtor in an action to enforce a foreign award.
Defenses to Enforcement, supra note 326, at 418 n.44. However, the case settled before the
district court could make any determination. Id. at 409 n.9.
343. Defenses to Enforcement, supra note 326, at 427.
344. 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002).
345. Id. at 501.
346. Id. at 491-92.
347. Id. at 492.
348. Id. at 496-97.
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territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid
down in the following articles." '349
The Second Circuit's reasoning, however, is flawed. First,
without any analysis, the court quickly concluded that Article V's
exclusive defenses to enforcement are substantive, rather than
procedural.35 This interpretation permitted the court to find that
there were no procedural restrictions in the text of the Convention
that prevented the procedural doctrine of forum non conveniens from
being applied in Convention cases.35 However, without analyzing
each of the defenses, this seems like a hasty decision. While some of
the grounds for non-enforcement in Article V may have substantive
components, most are purely procedural in nature,352 and none of
them allow for a substantive review on the merits. In addition, the
court's holding that Article V does not set forth the only grounds for
refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award is inconsistent with the
language of section 207 of the FAA. 53 Finally, applying the doctrine
of forum non conveniens flouts the central purpose of the New York
Convention: "to unify the standards by which ... arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries." '354 While forum non conveniens
may have been correctly applied to the dismissal of the State of
Ukraine in that it was a non-party to the original arbitration, the
Second Circuit's approval of its use in Convention enforcement
actions is misguided.355 Courts should refrain from using this
doctrine in future enforcement actions subject to the New York
Convention.
b. Enforcement of vacated arbitral awards
Over the past several years, a handful of enforcement actions in
federal courts have raised a controversial question: when, if ever,
349. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40;
Monegasque de Reassurances, 311 F.3d at 496.
350. Monegasque de Reassurances, 311 F.3d at 496.
351. Id. at 495-96.
352. E.g., New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(b)-(d), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
353. Section 207 provides that "[t]he court shall confirm the award unless itfinds one of the
grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said
Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (emphasis added).
354. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
355. See Defenses to Enforcement, supra note 326, at 433-35.
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should a U.S. court enforce an international arbitral award that has
been vacated in the arbitral situs?.356 The few courts that have
addressed the issue have not uniformly clarified the extent to which
annulment abroad supports a refusal to recognize or enforce a foreign
arbitral award.
357
In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt,35 the
most widely discussed and notorious of these decisions, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia enforced an arbitral award
that had been rendered and subsequently vacated in Egypt.359
Focusing on the language of Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention, the court determined that it had discretion to enforce an
annulled award. 6° In enforcing the award, the court relied on Article
VII of the Convention,' which notes that the Convention "shall not.
. . deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail
himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed
by the law... of the country where such award is sought to be relied
upon." '362 The court interpreted this language to mean that chapter 1
of the FAA gave Chromalloy a means to enforce the award and,
therefore, enforcement could only be refused if the court determined
that one of the exceptions in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) applied or that there
was evidence of "manifest disregard of the law" on the part of the
arbitrators.363 Finally, the court noted that even though the arbitration
clause in the contract between the parties stated that any award
"cannot be made subject to any appeal or other recourse," an
356. See Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999);
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora del Atlantico S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C.
2006); Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chromalloy
Aeroservs. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
357. Erica Smith, Note, Vacated Arbitral Awards: Recognition and Enforcement Outside the
Country of Origin, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 355, 371 (2002).
358. 939 F. Supp. 907.
359. Id. at 911.
360. Id. at 909. Article V(1)(e) states that "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused... [upon] proof that ... [t]he award has... been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made." New York
Convention, supra note 7, arts. V(1), V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42
(emphasis added).
361. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 909.
362. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. VII(l), 21 U.S.T. at 2520-21, 330 U.N.T.S. at
42, 44.
363. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 910 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 942 (1995)).
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Egyptian court still took jurisdiction over the annulment proceedings
and vacated the award.3" Remarking that there was strong U.S.
public policy to recognize binding arbitration clauses, the court
stated that recognizing the decision of the Egyptian court would
violate this policy.
365
Other U.S. courts that have considered the issue have
distinguished Chromalloy, but have left unanswered whether
enforcement of annulled awards remains discretionary or forbidden
in U.S. courts. In Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd.,366
the Second Circuit rejected the conclusion reached in Chromalloy
that Article VII allows domestic law to govern enforcement
proceedings of awards vacated in other countries.367 However, citing
Chromalloy, the Baker Marine court suggested that the enforcing
court has discretionary power to enforce annulled awards upon the
showing of an "adequate reason." '368 In Spier v. Calzaturificio
Tecnica, S.p.A.,3 69  the Southern District of New York also
distinguished Chromalloy, but noted that there was no "adequate
reason" for refusing to recognize the award, which was rendered in
Italy.37° Even more recently, in the same forum where Chromalloy
was decided, the District Court for the District of Columbia was even
more direct, stating that "a rule that a U.S. court must dismiss a case
because a foreign court nullified an arbitral award would violate the
New York Convention provision [in Article V(1)(e)]."37'
364. Id. at 912.
365. Id. at 913.
366. 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
367. Id. at 196-97. In a footnote, the court stated:
Furthermore, as a practical matter, mechanical application of domestic arbitral law
to foreign awards under the Convention would seriously undermine finality and
regularly produce conflicting judgments. If a party whose arbitration award has been
vacated at the site of the award can automatically obtain enforcement of the awards
under the domestic laws of other nations, a losing party will have every reason to
pursue its adversary "with enforcement actions from country to country until a court is
found, if any, which grants the enforcement."
Id. at 197 n.2 (quoting ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 355 (1981)).
368. Id. at 197 & n.3.
369. 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
370. Id. at 287-88.
371. TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora del Atlantico S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87,
93 (D.D.C. 2006).
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Commentators have clashed over whether U.S. courts should be
able to enforce arbitral awards annulled in foreign territories.372 The
United States is one of only a few countries whose courts have
enforced annulled arbitral awards.373 While the seemingly permissive
language of Article V of the New York Convention does suggest the
possibility of enforcing annulled awards, international comity would
best be served by limiting such enforcement to rare occurrences. For
example, if the courts in the arbitral situs annul an award based on
grounds analogous to those in Article V(1)(a)-(d) of the New York
Convention, this should be given great weight by courts of the place
of enforcement.374  United States courts should only consider
enforcement of vacated awards when the annulment is either based
on a very minor procedural technicality that fails to rise to the
standards of annulment under U.S. law375 or is the product of bias,
corruption, a denial of due process, or a violation of public policy
that jeopardizes a vital public interest.376 To hold otherwise and
expand the scope of this delicate issue could lead to such
consequences as a lack of international coordination and
372. For example, Christopher Drahozal supports an "economic approach" to the enforcement
of vacated awards that would permit parties to resolve the question with a contractual clause, such
as, "The arbitral award may be enforced even if set aside by a competent authority in the country
in which the award was made." Drahozal, An Economic Approach, supra note 230, at 478.
William Park suggests that a court should decline to enforce a vacated award unless the vacating
court decision was "procedurally unfair or contrary to fundamental notions of justice." William
W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 813 (1999).
Jan Paulsson suggests that courts should only enforce an annulled award if the basis for
annulment was not one recognized in international practice or was based on "an intolerable
criterion." U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), supra note 57, at 25.
Conversely, Hamid Gharavi notes that while the practice of enforcing annulled awards may have
some validity, its negative consequences are drastic, "generat[ing] an instability prejudicial to
international commercial arbitration and deal[ing] a serious blow to the reputation and
development of this international dispute settlement mechanism." GHARAVI, supra note 268, at
119, 138.
373. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 77. Courts in France, Belgium, and Austria have also
enforced annulled awards. See id. at 78-92. It is well established that "[an arbitration award
vacated by the arbitral situs can nonetheless be enforced in France if it satisfies French standards
for enforcing awards." Drahozal, An Economic Approach, supra note 230, at 462.
374. Webster, supra note 95, at 225.
375. See id.
376. Davis, supra note 20, at 85. While the Chromalloy court recognized enforcing
arbitration agreements as a significant policy interest, 939 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D.D.C. 1996), in
reality, "the policy to enforce arbitration agreements and awards does not implicate such vital
national concerns that it should trump a foreign annulment judgment." Davis, supra note 20, at
85.
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harmonization, the emergence of biased enforcement decisions, or a
violation of the will of the parties.377
4. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Foreign Courts
The drafters of the New York Convention intended for the
defenses to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to be
applied restrictively.3 78 Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
containing the same defenses to enforcement as Article V of the
Convention, recognizes the drafters' intent.379 Most national courts
have recognized that the grounds for refusal for enforcement must be
construed narrowly.38  However, while there may be a "pro-
enforcement bias" in the United States and most developed countries,
courts in some states "play the game less fairly than others," by
interpreting the "public policy" exception of Article V(2)(b) broadly
and by remaining suspicious of international arbitration.38" '
National courts in England are very reluctant to refuse to enforce
a foreign arbitral award on the grounds of public policy, although
there are rare exceptions.382 Likewise, national courts in such
countries as Switzerland, Luxembourg, South Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, Italy, and Germany have taken a narrow approach to the
public policy exception to deny recognition to an international
arbitral award.38 3  In contrast, courts in Russia and Turkey have
allowed the public policy defense in circumstances which seem
unjustified. 84 In China, the public policy defense may be used to
protect what some may regard as purely local interests.385
377. GHARAVI, supra note 268, at 119.
378. See ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 445 (4th ed. 2004).
379. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB. art. 36 (1985).
380. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 378, at 445 & n.69.
381. Id. at445-46.
382. Id. at 456 (citing Soleimany v. Soleimany, [1999] Q.B. 785, 800).
383. BORN, supra note 46, at 824-25. There are a few instances where courts of developed
nations have refused enforcement based on public policy, but usually they do so on due process
grounds. Id. at 825-26.
384. See REDFERN ET AL., supra note 378, at 459; William A. Isaacson, Enforcement
Difficulties Are Increasing, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9. In Russia, for example, one judge
refused to enforce an award against a Russian defendant because a portion of the money was
expected to come from the public purse. Id.
385. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 378, at 459; see also Tao, Arbitration in China, supra note
126, at 49 ("Foreign perceptions of the enforcement of arbitration awards in the PRC are often
filled with frustration and cynicism if not downright hopelessness. The institutional weaknesses
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Furthermore, legislation in Pakistan allows its national courts to
deem arbitral awards rendered in foreign territories as domestic, if
the substantive law applied was that of Pakistan.386 This directly
conflicts with the purpose of the New York Convention. Ultimately,
when the losing party has assets located in different countries,
differing interpretations of the New York Convention's enforcement
regime may lead to forum shopping."' While this is not necessarily
a major drawback,388 the interests of the international business sector
would best be served by global uniformity of enforcement standards.
Until developing nations begin to have greater faith in the arbitral
system and less bias in favor of their nationals (especially when they
are the losing party), international businesses should "take every
precaution to mitigate risk associated with an uncertain . . . legal
environment." '389
E. State International Arbitration Statutes
Over the past two decades, many states have enacted
international arbitration statutes as an attempt to bring international
commercial arbitration business to their territory.39° Several of these
states, including California, Texas, Connecticut, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Oregon, have modeled their statutes after the UNCITRAL
Model Law, under the (perhaps mistaken) assumption that foreign
parties will be familiar with its application.39' In addition, other
of Chinese courts... [and] increasing strength of local state governments... have all reinforced
the sour international image of Chinese enforcement . .
386. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 378, at 446.
387. See id. at 471.
388. See generally Petrossian, supra note 7, at 1265 (discussing some commentators'
viewpoint that forum shopping is beneficial and should be encouraged).
389. Isaacson, supra note 384 (noting that parties to an international arbitration should take
such steps as specifying the place of appeal, securing insurance policies designed to protect
against business loss, and selecting the place of arbitration with an eye towards the legal regime
governing the conduct of the arbitration).
390. Heather A. Purcell, Comment, State International Arbitration Statutes: Why They
Matter, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 525, 526 (1997).
391. Id. at 529-30; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.432 (Deering 2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-100 to -136 (2003); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 30/1-1 to /99-99 (2003); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30 to .68 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2712.01-.91 (LexisNexis
2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-558 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
172.001-.310 (Vernon 2005). Some of the statutes contain statements noting that the purpose of
the legislation is to promote international arbitration in the state. For example, the Oregon
International Commercial Arbitration Act states:
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states, such as Maryland, Georgia, and Colorado, do not go so far
and have merely added provisions governing international
arbitrations to their domestic state arbitration statutes.39 In fact,
Maryland has simply incorporated the FAA to serve as the legal
framework governing international arbitrations within its territory.393
Finally, Florida and Hawaii have each taken an ad hoc approach to
legislation regarding international arbitration, drawing on diverse and
unique sources.394
Commentators have noted that state laws governing
international arbitrations could suffer from preemption at the hands
of the FAA.39 5 While their analysis has differed, there has been some
agreement among these commentators that state international
arbitration statutes might be given special weight when the parties'
arbitration agreement contains a choice of law clause.396 Based on
the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Universitj 97 and
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,3  commentators
have suggested that parties who are interested in having a state
It is the policy of the Legislative Assembly to encourage the use of arbitration and
conciliation to resolve disputes arising out of international relationships and to assure
access to the courts of this state for legal proceedings ancillary to or otherwise in aid of
such arbitration and conciliation and to encourage the participation and use of Oregon
facilities and resources to carry out the purposes of [the Oregon International
Commercial Arbitration Act].
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.452(1).
392. Purcell, supra note 390, at 530; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-501 to -507
(2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -43 (1982); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01
to -09 (LexisNexis 2006).
393. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-03(a) ("In all matters relating to the process
and enforcement of international commercial arbitration and awards, the laws of Maryland shall
be the arbitration statutes and laws of the United States.").
394. Purcell, supra note 390, at 531; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 684.01-35 (2006); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 658-D-1 to -9 (1993).
395. See generally Sebastien Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International
Commercial Arbitration and Their Compatibility with the FAA, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 211
(2000) (discussing general principles of preemption of state laws by federal arbitration laws and
identifying potential and actual conflicts between state and federal arbitration law that could
trigger preemption); Daniel A. Zeft, The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes
and the Absence of Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 705
(1997) (examining state arbitration statutes to determine whether federal arbitration law ought to
preempt such state statutes).
396. Besson, supra note 395, at 241-42; Zeft, supra note 395, at 790-92; Purcell, supra note
390, at 540-41.
397. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
398. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
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international arbitration law govern their dispute should include a
choice of law clause that expressly reveals their intentions to have
such a state law provision apply instead of the FAA.399
Ultimately, though, these state laws have had little effect on the
international arbitration community. Because of the "well-
established national interest to speak with one voice on the
international scene," international arbitration in the United States
would best be served through FAA reform.4"' The time has come for
Congress to implement a comprehensive national scheme for
international arbitration, beyond the simple legislation implementing
the enforcement of awards under the New York and Panama
Conventions.4"' This would eliminate any ongoing confusion
regarding preemption issues with the FAA and state international
arbitration statutes and provide foreign parties with a better
understanding in advance what legal regime will govern their
arbitration in the United States.4"'
F. Alternatives to International Commercial Arbitration:
Mediation, Conciliation, and Other Mechanisms
Arbitration may be the mechanism of choice for the resolution
of international business disputes, but in recent years, alternative
methods of dispute resolution have begun to gain prominence.4 3
Still, while ADR techniques such as mediation are thoroughly
established and accepted within the United States,4 4 they are
relatively new phenomena for resolving international commercial
399. Zeft, supra note 395, at 791-92. In order to conform with the requirements of
Mastrobuono, the choice of law clause must be clear and unequivocal that state arbitration law
applies. Besson, supra note 395, at 242.
400. Besson, supra note 395, at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BORN, supra
note 46, at 227-28); cf United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
lines disappear.").
401. For a comprehensive analysis on how the FAA might be reformed, see Park, The Case
for FAA Reform, supra note 276.
402. Besson, supra note 395, at 245.
403. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 169. In certain regions of the world, some
forms of ADR have been part of the culture for generations. Id. In particular, many Asian
countries, most notably China, have a longstanding tradition of using conciliation to resolve
disputes. Id. at 169-70. This is deeply rooted in Confucian philosophy and its emphasis on
social harmony. Id. at 178.
404. See David J.A. Cairns, Mediating International Commercial Disputes: Differences in
U.S. and European Approaches, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2005, at 62, 64.
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disputes.4 °5 This could be due to the fact that many lawyers from
civil law jurisdictions in continental Europe lack familiarity with
ADR.406
However, the European community has begun to recognize the
vital importance that ADR can have on international business
relations. In October 2004, the European Commission ("EC")
released the "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and
Commercial Matters" 4°7 ("Proposed EU Directive") in an attempt to
establish common rules throughout the European Union ("EU") for
mediation and its relationship with judicial proceedings.4 8 The
Proposed EU Directive gives member states until September 2007 to
enact domestic laws that comply with its terms.4 9  Thus, should
member states adopt the Proposed EU Directive through
implementing legislation, what will result is a uniform, predictable
framework for recourse to mediation in Europe.4 ' 0 This will likely
raise the profile of mediation in continental Europe, which could lead
to its increased use, as well as the proliferation of other ADR
processes in international business disputes.41'
While mediation and conciliation are the most commonly used
forms of ADR globally, there are a variety of alternative techniques
appropriate for international commercial disputes, including Med-
Arb and mini-trial. And, despite differences in form and structure,
ADR mechanisms share common advantages and disadvantages.
One major advantage of ADR over international arbitration is its
inherently low transaction costs.412 ADR procedures are not only
much shorter in duration than arbitration, but they are significantly
405. BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 169.
406. Cairns, supra note 404, at 64.
407. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2004) 718 final (Oct. 22,
2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2004/com2004_0718en01 .pdf [herein-
after Proposed EU Directive].
408. Cairns, supra note 404, at 64.
409. Proposed EU Directive, supra note 407, art. 9, at 12.
410. Cairns, supra note 404, at 66.
411. See id. at 64.
412. BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 206.
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less expensive.4"3 In addition, ADR methods provide parties with
considerable autonomy to tailor the processes to the dispute, thus
allowing for a less adversarial atmosphere and the potential to devise
creative remedies. 4 To this end, due to the voluntary nature of these
processes, if the parties do not agree on a decision, none will be
imposed." 5 Furthermore, the settlement-based nature of ADR lends
itself to confidentiality; indeed, in most ADR sessions, the parties
will stipulate to rules of confidentiality before discussing anything
substantive." 6
The most significant advantages of non-arbitral ADR techniques
are in the results, as they can lead to more effective solutions to
disputes and preserve relationships between antagonistic parties.4"7
For instance, negotiated settlements have a much greater potential to
accurately reflect the specific interests of the parties, as opposed to
judge- or arbitrator-rendered awards.418  Moreover, since ADR
procedures are often best utilized at the beginning of a dispute, they
can prevent the dispute from "taking on a life of its own" and can
lead to amicable solutions that actually improve relations between
the parties. 9
Though ADR is premised on voluntary participation and party
autonomy, it does have disadvantages. One weakness is that ADR
mechanisms lack a coherent legal framework for ensuring the
enforceability of results.42 There is no analogue to the New York
Convention for mediation and other ADR processes. Thus,
"alternative procedures are subject to the full range of legal problems
arising out of the multiplicity of legal systems that affect
international trade."42' In addition, when negotiations have reached
413. Id. For example, "a typical business mediation will last between one and three days,
compared to an average duration of international arbitration proceedings of more than two years."
Id.
414. See id. at 174-75; see also Barker, supra note 8, at 9-10 (noting several advantages of
international commercial mediation).
415. Tobi P. Dress, International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation, 10 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 574 (1988).
416. Id.
417. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 206-07.
418. Id. at206.
419. Id. at 207.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 224. If the Proposed EU Directive turns out to be a success, it could be the step in
the right direction towards unifying international ADR standards.
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an impasse and antagonistic feelings worsen, getting the parties to
even participate in ADR can be difficult.422 Nevertheless, in today's
international legal climate, where costs can be exorbitant and
protracted litigation can put a damper on the growth of international
trade, the benefits of ADR greatly outweigh any drawbacks.
1. International Mediation and Conciliation
Mediation and conciliation are very similar, yet somewhat
distinguishable mechanisms. While there is no universally accepted
definition of mediation, it can faithfully be described as a process
whereby a neutral third party mediator helps disputing parties
negotiate a settlement agreement "by employing various techniques
designed to elicit essential facts, to ascertain the respective positions
and concerns of the disputants, and to fashion a basis upon which the
parties may continue their relationship to mutual advantage. 423 In
this informal setting, the mediator provides an impartial viewpoint to
facilitate communications between the parties, and does not herself
make a decision or impose an award.4 24 By contrast, conciliation is a
more formal and structured process, whereby a neutral third party
conciliator may even hear evidence, discuss settlement options with
the parties, and prepare written recommendations.4 5 In addition, a
conciliator in an international dispute may also engage in preliminary
fact-finding, something not done by a mediator. 26  Despite these
relatively minor differences between mediation and conciliation, the
remainder of this article will refer to the terms synonymously.
Over the past decade, mediation has become a major force in
resolving international commercial disputes.4 27  However, while
many international commercial contracts have multi-tiered dispute
resolution clauses, most of these clauses provide for a period of
"friendly consultation" or "good faith negotiation" prior to
422. Id. at 229. It is unsettled whether an obligation to participate in ADR is enforceable, as
few courts have dealt with the issue. Id. at 230.
423. COE, supra note 37, at 35.
424. Barker, supra note 8, at 10-11; Dress, supra note 415, at 573.
425. Dress, supra note 415, at 574; see also Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for
the Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 578,
584 (1991).
426. Dress, supra note 415, at 574.
427. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra note 11, at 219; see also Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating
International Business Disputes, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 449 (2004).
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arbitration, rather than mediation.428 Nevertheless, international
arbitration institutions throughout the world recognize that mediation
is a vital component of international dispute resolution and have
developed rules in an attempt to attract parties to utilize their ADR
services."' Thus, like international arbitration, international
mediation can be conducted on an institutional or ad hoc basis.
Each of the three major arbitration institutions have promulgated
specific rules governing international ADR. In 2001, the ICC issued
its ADR Rules, which "offer a framework for the amicable
settlement of commercial disputes with the assistance of a neutral."43
The ICC's ADR Rules permit parties to agree upon whatever
settlement technique they feel is appropriate to resolve their
dispute.43' In the absence of an agreement, mediation is the default
method of resolution.432 Like the ICC, both the AAA and the LCIA
also administer international mediation. However, as opposed to the
ICC, their rules are expressly limited to mediation services.433
Unlike institutional mediation, in ad hoc mediation, the parties
define the organization and structure of the proceedings.434 Many
parties choose to utilize International Conciliation Rules
promulgated by UNCITRAL in 1980"3' in conducting their non-
administered mediation or conciliation.436  The UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules have served as a model for many institutional
rules and have greatly influenced modern international conciliation
and mediation procedures.437 Noticing the increased use of mediation
to resolve international business disputes, in 2002, UNCITRAL
428. See TOWARDS A SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 59-60.
429. Helmer, supra note 4, at 48.
430. ICC ADR Dispute Resolution Services, http://www.iccwbo.org/drs/english/adr/all
_jopics.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) [hereinafter ICC ADR Services].
431. Id.
432. ICC ADR RULES art. 5.2 (2001), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/drs/english/adr/
pdf documents/adrrules.pdf.
433. AM. ARB. ASS'N INT'L MEDIATION RULES (Am. Arb. Ass'n 2006), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28144#IntlMedRules; LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARB. MEDI-
ATION PROCEDURE (1999), available at http://www.lcia.org/ADR-folder/documents/mediation
.pdf.
434. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 39.
435. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) CONCILIATION RULES (1980)
(amended 2002), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules/
conc-rules-e.pdf.
436. See Slate et al., UNCITRAL, supra note 142, at 94.
437. Id.
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drafted a Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
("Model Conciliation Law")438 to serve as a template for lawmakers
in national governments to consider adopting as part of their
domestic legislation. 39 Since the Model Conciliation Law was
drafted, however, only Canada, Croatia, Hungary, and Nicaragua
have enacted legislation based upon it." In addition, Illinois, Iowa,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington have incorporated
legislation based on the Model Conciliation Law into their respective
codes.44' Ultimately, in order for international mediation and
conciliation to begin to reach the level of acceptance and familiarity
that international arbitration has attained, more countries need to
adopt legislation based on the Model Conciliation Law. One author
notes:
As the burgeoning Internet world continues to expand, and
countries' borders continue to become less significant
obstacles to effective international commercial transactions,
the implementation of an International Model [Conciliation]
Law to guide the settlement of disputes will reassure the
disputing parties and might ultimately reaffirm their
confidence in participating within the sphere of
international trade." 2
The typical international mediation begins with the introduction
of the mediator and the parties, during which the mediator will
explain the goals and structure of the mediation and discuss the role
of confidentiality in the proceeding. 443 Thereafter, each party makes
an opening statement which may include, among other things,
pertinent facts, legal theories, and assessments of liability and
damages.444 Next, the mediator often provides a summary of the
essential points raised by the parties and then helps the parties
438. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL CONCILIATION WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT AND USE (2002), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-conc/ml-conc-e.pdf.
439. Slate et al., UNCITRAL, supra note 142, at 95.
440. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 2002 Status,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/2002Model-conciliation-status.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
441. Id.
442. Slate et al., UNCITRAL, supra note 142, at 96-97.
443. Barker, supra note 8, at 13.
444. Id.
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develop an agenda for the mediation." 5 The negotiation process
usually begins with an open session including both parties, but if this
becomes unproductive, the mediator will adjourn to hold private
"caucuses" with each party individually."6 Caucuses allow parties to
be candid with the mediator. Thus, the mediator gains a more
coherent perspective of the dispute and the parties' realistic goals and
expectations." 7 Caucuses often result in a settlement between the
parties, but if no agreement can be reached, the entire process likely
will have provided guidelines and expectations for future
negotiations." 8
In international mediation, parties likely come from different
cultural backgrounds. Therefore, a strong potential for
miscommunications during the mediation may exist due to major
cross-cultural differences." 9 Miscommunications of this variety are
often the leading reason why international negotiations fail.45 Thus,
both the parties and the mediator need to be sensitive to cultural
differences and their effect on the communication process during the
mediation. One key to minimizing miscommunications is to hire
excellent interpreters for the mediation.45 Likewise, mediators
should consider "put[ting] the cultural card on the table" during the
introduction and opening statements, pointing out to the parties that
they should be conscious of cultural differences in their approaches
to problems.452  Alternatively, mediators should consider other
techniques, such as keeping the cultural issues in mind and bringing
them up as a method of breaking a "log-jam" between the parties, or
using the culture factor as an "ice-breaker" that each side can laugh
about, so to help ease tension between the parties and build
rapport.453
445. Id.
446. Id. at 13-14.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 14-15.
449. Id. at 18. "Cross-cultural miscommunication occurs when an individual from one
culture misinterprets the message that an individual from another culture intended." Id.
450. Id. at 19.
451. Posin, supra note 427, at 471.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 472.
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2. Other Methods of ADR
Beyond mediation and conciliation, other non-arbitral ADR
mechanisms have developed as effective means of settling disputes
between parties. While there are many methods that may be utilized
in the international setting, this section will focus on two noteworthy
techniques: mini-trial and med-arb.
a. Mini-trial
A mini-trial is not really a trial in the adjudicative sense, but is
rather a "predictive process designed to narrow the differences
between the parties' perceptions of their chances in litigation and to
bring high-level decisionmakers together for constructive settlement
negotiations." '454 In this procedure, the parties' counsel first exchange
legal memoranda and exhibits, and then argue their case before a
panel of the parties' executives, who carry authority to resolve and
settle the dispute.455 These representatives may be assisted by a third
party "neutral advisor." '456 After presentations have been made, the
executives, and potentially the third party, will meet for private
negotiations, in the hopes of working out a settlement.457
Because of the confidential nature of ADR, it is impossible to
know how many international mini-trials have been conducted, but it
appears that the concept is slowly gaining acceptance in the
international business community. 458 This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the ICC's ADR Rules now allow parties to choose mini-
trial as a settlement technique to be administered by the institution.459
Ultimately, considering that large international business disputes can
produce an enormous volume of documentary evidence, the
"condensed and structured information exchange [in a mini-trial] can
... offer an excellent basis for settlement negotiations between high-
level executives. 460
454. BOHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 195.
455. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 42; see also BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1,
at 195.
456. INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 74, at 42.
457. BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 195.
458. Id. at 196.
459. ICC ADR Services, supra note 430.
460. BUHRING-UHLE ETAL., supra note 1, at 197.
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b. Med-arb
Med-arb is an abbreviated term for mediation combined with
arbitration.461 It is a two-stage process "wherein mediation precedes
arbitration," and arbitration is only necessary when mediation fails.462
This ADR process is intended to allow disputants to profit from
advantages of both mediation and arbitration. 463 While med-arb has
not become a commonplace practice in the international context, it
does have adherents in certain regions of the world, such as China
and Hong Kong.
The typical procedure is as follows: first, a third-party neutral
uses mediation techniques to try to bring the parties towards
resolution.465  If unsuccessful, the neutral (or the "med-arbitrator")
switches roles and becomes an arbitrator for the next stage of the
procedure.466 There has been ample criticism of med-arb because it
allows the same person to conduct both the mediation and the
arbitration.467 Due to the confidential nature of mediation and the
fact that non-legal (i.e. emotional or private) information may be
provided to the mediator during the caucuses, many feel that this
system could foster impartiality in the med-arbitrator.468
In recent years, to combat this potential drawback of med-arb,
alternative formats of the process have been developed. For
example, in "Med-Arb-Opt-Out," each party is entitled to
independently call for a different person to be appointed for the
arbitration portion of the proceedings after mediation is completed.469
Another modified method of med-arb is MEDALOA, short for
461. James T. Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 83
(1997).
462. COE, supra note 37, at 46.
463. Peter, supra note 461, at 88.
464. See id. at 106-09.
465. Id. at 90 (describing the "original med-arb" process).
466. Id.
467. See id. at 91. The ICC ADR Rules permits a person who has served as a mediator or
conciliator to be appointed as an arbitrator only if all the parties consent in writing. See ICC
ADR RULES art. 7.3 (2001). On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules state that
"[t]he parties and the conciliator undertake that the conciliator will not act as an arbitrator or as a
representative or counsel of a party in any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of a dispute
that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings." U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW
(UNCITRAL) CONCILIATION RULES art. 19 (1980) (amended 2002).
468. See Peter, supra note 461, at 91-94.
469. Id. at 98.
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Mediation and Last Offer Arbitration. 7° In this procedure, "[i]f the
parties do not settle through agreement, each party . . . submits a
'final offer' to the med-arbitrator," who, in choosing between one of
them, renders a binding arbitration award.47" '
G. Conclusion
As globalization takes center stage in the current information
age, the old adage "all business is local" may no longer have the
same bite it once had. With each passing day, more and more
businesses are hopping on the gravy train that is international
commerce. To that end, the twenty-first century legal community
must be poised to address a veritable explosion in the realm of global
alternative dispute resolution practices. Hopefully, such economic
growth will foster better international relations and lead to an
increased level of consistency and faith in these vital problem
solving methods.
470. Id. at 100.
471. Id.
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